
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BOSTON UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

KANT'S TREATMENT OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOD

by

Albert Georg Wiederhold
(Gymnasien and Seminars)
submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

1936 *

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Dedicated

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose and the sources of the thesis. The purpose of the thesis is to consider Kant's treatment of the arguments for God. This ought to be done purely scientifically without any religious or credal interests. My intention is to give Kant's position as truly as I can without being influenced by the opinions of others about Kant. He ought to have a chance to plead his own case and nobody should interrupt him in stating his own position. This does of course not mean that none should criticise him; but it does mean that one has no right to make any judgment about him unless one has heard and understood him,

Outside literature about Kant has been purposely neglected and is only used for illustration, explanation, or criticism of Kant's position. The main sources of this thesis are Kant's own works, the Cassirer edition of which I used.

Kant's unique influence upon modern thought. Kant's influence upon the whole of modern thought is unique: His subjective criticism gave a new path for modern epistemology.

He dealt with the problem of the possibility of a metaphysic to such an extent and with such a skepticism as no

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other philosopher before him. Kant's skeptical treatment of metaphysics laid the foundation for the common modern skepticism toward it.

Kant introduced into the moral philosophy the autonomy of the moral law and the significance of the categorical imperative for religious life.

He challenged the validity of the traditional theodicy by rejecting all theoretical arguments for God as inadequate and by postulating the existence of God merely from the pure practical reason. In doing this Kant paved the way for the modern skeptical attitude toward religion which restricts it to the realm of the irrational.

Kant's philosophy of religion is new. He wanted a religion without revelation and dogma. His new religion was based upon the moral law. The duty of religion is to realize the categorical imperative. In making morality the essence of religion Kant became the pioneer for humanism. The program of this new humanistic religion is "human control by human effort in accordance with human ideals."

In his work, Zum ewigen Frieden, Kant laid down the principles of the League of Nations. He stood for justice and mutual understanding and rejected the policy of force and violence. He urged to abandon all secret diplomacy among nations. All the deeds of men should be able to stand the daily sunlight or should not be done at all.

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Kant's philosophical reflections are very closely connected with his epistemology. His whole philosophical system stands or falls with it. This is especially true about Kant's treatment of the arguments for God. In his own writings one finds a very close connection between both. It is due to the inner nature of all arguments for God. All of them are based upon epistemological presuppositions.

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CHAPTER II

KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF HIS TREATMENT OF
THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOD

The epistemology of Kant as the basis for his arguments for God. All arguments for God are based upon the following three fundamental epistemological presuppositions:

The reality of the internal and of the external world. All arguments for God presuppose that it is possible to establish the reality of the internal and of the external world or of the microcosm and of the macrocosm. They take furthermore for granted that reality is not necessarily limited to the phenomenal world; but that it is metaphysical. The reality of the internal and of the external world are the foundation which underlie all proofs for the existence of God. If they were not reality then all our arguments were in vain and full of illusions.

The universal validity of the law of phenomenal causality. The causal argument presupposes a theoretical recognition of the universal validity of the law of causality. The law of cause and effect gives us a means to find the last and ultimate cause - - God. It gives sufficient reason to explain the ultimate grounds of the world if its principles are universally valid and necessary.

The theoretical possibility of an understanding of the supersensory. All arguments for God presuppose a theoretical

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possibility for men to obtain some information about the metaphysical reality. Without it no argument for God had any
validity whatsoever. The object of all of them is a supersensory Being.

These three presuppositions are predominant in the Kantian philosophy. All of them had to be established by his epistemology. It is simply impossible to understand Kant's theology without an understanding of his epistemology.

The philosophic-historical presuppositions for Kant's epistemology. These are: the system of innate ideas of Leibnitz and Descartes, the empiricism of Locke, and the skepticism of Hume.

1) Leibnitzband Descartes' system of innate ideas.

Kant shared with Leibnitz and Descartes the notion of innate principles or primary notions. But he transcended them in classifying them. He constructed a threefold schema which included: innate intuitions, conceptions, and ideas. While with Leibnitz and Descartes the innate ideas are a reflection of the objective reality they are with Kant purely subjective formations.

2) Locke's empiricism.

Together with Locke Kant limits knowledge to the phenomenal reality or to the sense-data. The speculative reason cannot obtain any knowledge of the transcendent reality.

Man's thought cannot penetrate into the realm of transcendent reality.

Kant urges that it is impossible to put together

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and to unite synthetically appearance and the <u>Ding-an-sich</u>; because appearance and non-appearance are contradictions.

Standing in accord with Locke Kant denied the objectivity of the conception of substance and cause and of the
so-called secondary or derived sensible qualities, (colour,
sound, etc.). Locke hold that all sensible qualities are
only in the perceiving subject and not properly in the things
perceived. They are simply signs and not copies of changes
which take place in the external world.

3) Hume's skepticism. Just as Hume Kant rejected the objectivity and the universal validity of the law of causality. Hume finds its origin in habit which leads us to expect that under similar circumstances one event will be followed by an similar one which we have often seen joined with it. He limits the application of the conception of causality to those cases in which from given facts we conclude, according to analogies of experience, to others. Hume denied the possibility of our knowing the nature and the mode of the objective connection between causes and effects. He also denied the philosophical legitimacy of our attempting to transcend, by means of the causal idea, the whole field of experience and to conclude to the existence of God and the immortality of the human soul. Kant's standpoint is very much similar to that of Hume as will be shown later on. But even though Kant stood under the influence of Hume he did not loose his

Erdman, HPH, vol.ii, 79.

berweg; HPH, vol.ii, 131 seq.

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Bromen, HPS, vol.12, 78, tog.

originality. Contrary to Hume he dealt with the problem of causality in connection with the synthetic judgments a priori.

4) The philosophy of Wolff.

Also Wolff's philosophy influenced Kant considerably, but more in that what it had in common with Leibnitz and Descartes than through its own system. Christian Wolff adopted the theories of Leibnitz and combined them with ideas derived particularly from Aristotle. He modified them, and brought them into a system of thought. But his philosophy was not original like that of Hume, Leibnitz, and Descartes.

The characteristics of the Kantian epistemology.

The characteristics of the Kantian epistemology are the following:

- 1) Kant's notion of sense-perception, representations or intuitions.
 - a) The limitation of knowledge to sense-experience.

nal reality and the <u>Ding-an-sich</u>. The essence of all things, the <u>Ding-an-sich</u>, the noumenal reality, is inaccessible to the human understanding. The noumenal reality is beyond man's reach, for man is sense-bound and cannot penetrate into the realm of the transcendental reality. It is impossible to put together and to unite synthetically appearance and the <u>Ding-an-sich</u>, because appearance and non-appearance are contradictions.

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The human understanding is limited to the phenomenal reality and to sense-experiences. Man's perceptions, representations or intuitions are all sensuous and as such limited to the world of sensibility. They deal only with appearances, but not with the Ding-an-sich in its noumenal reality. There is a fundamental dualism between the Ding-an-sich and its appearance as a phenomenon. The things we see are not by themselves so as we see them, not even is their inner relation so as it appears to us, for if we would drop the subjective forms of our sense-intuitions, then all subjective qualities and relations of objects would disappear, and even space and time would Vanish. All of them cannot exist as phenomena by themselves, but they exist only in our human representation of reality. Consequently it remains completely unknown to us what the objects are apart from their appearances as phenomena. There is of course the possibility for our reason to form different imaginations of the nature of the superworld, but all of those are very problematical.

b) The subjectivity of human experience.

Whenever a thing appears to our senses it is transformed by subjective principles. Man attributes to them the sensible qualities and introduces into them his innate principles of time and space.

The human mind adds to all phenomena the forms of space and time and the so-called sensible qualities. All corporeal things appear to the human sensibility to have certain

reality and to sense-esquentences. Man's perceptions, represent one world of sensibility. They deal only with appearances, one not with the Ding-an-aich in its noumenal resilty. There is range add bus dolu-to-only an moowied mellant latnessand a ance as a phenomenon. The bidings we see are not by themselves at he we we them, not even in their tener relation so as it espents to us, for if we noted drop the subjective forms of our sensy-intelliges, then all subjective qualities and relations of pajects would disspect, and even space and tire would vanish. All of them cannot exist as phenomena by themselves, but they exist only in our namen representation of reality. of ered temporaly as sometheous wheat mont from our clostde leaginations of the nature of the augustorid, but all of these .Lestrameldoug vrov ous

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qualities; but all of these are subjective and conditioned by the human mind. Thus for instance color and sound are not absolute in their character but conditioned by the human understanding which perceives them as such. Kant himself states that

. . man unbeschadet der wirklichen Existenz äusserer Dinge von einer Menge ihrer Prädikate sagen könne: sie gehöreten nicht zu diesen Dingen an sich selbst, sondern nur zu ihren Erscheinungen, und hätten ausser unserer Vorstellung keine eigene Existenz, ist etwas, was schon lange vor Lockes Zeiten, am meisten aber nach diesen, allgemein angenommen und zugestanden ist. Dahin gehören die Warme, die Farbe, der Geschmack etc. Dass ich aber noch über diese, aus wichtigen Ursachen, die übrigen Qualitaten der Korper, die man primarias nennt, die Ausdehnung, den Ort, und überhaupt den Raum, mit allem, was ihm anhangig ist, (Undurchdringlichkeit oder Materialität, Gestalt etc.) auch mit zu den blossen Erscheinungen zähle, dawider kann man nicht den mindesten Grund der Unzulässigkeit anführen, und so wenig, wie der, so die Farben nicht als Eigenschaften, die dem Objekt an sich selbst, sondern nur dem Sinn des Sehens als Modifikationen anhangen, will gelten lassen, darum ein Idealist heissen kann: so wenig kann mein Lehrbegriff idealistisch heissen, bloss deshalb, weil ich finde, dass noch mehr, ja alle Eigenschaften, die die Amschauung eines Körpers ausmachen, bloss zu seiner Erscheinung gehören; denn die Existenz des Dinges, was erscheint, wird dadurch nicht wie beim wirklichen Idealism aufgeheben, sondern nur gezeigt, dass wir es, wie es an sich selbst sei, durch Sinne gar nicht erkennen können.

Space represents the objects of experience as existing side by side or in different places. It is a necessary representation a priori forming the very foundation of all external intuitions. Without it no external intuition is possible for man. It is therefore from the human standpoint alone that we speak about space, extended objects, etc. Space is nothing

⁵ Kant: KrV, B, 41. 6 Kant: KrV, B, 40.

qualities; but all of these ere subjective and conditioned by
the numer mind. Trues for instance would and according not their character but conditioned by the mass understanting which perceives them as such. Hant intensit states
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Space represents the objects of experience as emisting and by side or in different places. It is a mecessary represent contection a priori forming the very foundation of all esternal intuitions. Without it no external intuition is possible for man. It is therefore from the human standpoint alone that we speck shout space, extended objects, etc. Space is nothing

Hamb: MrV, B, 41.

else but subjective and formal conditions of our sensibility.

7
Kant himself says:

Der Raum stellet gar keine Eigenschaft irgendeiner Dinge an sich oder sie in ihrem Verhältnis aufeinander vor, d.i. keine Bestimmung derselben, die an Gegenständen selbst haftete, und welche bliebe, wenn man auch von allen subjektiven Bedingungen der Anschauung abstrahierte. Denn weder absolute, noch relative Bestimmungen können vor dem Dasein der Dinge, welchen sie zukommen, mithin nicht a priori angeschaut werden.

Time is another a priori representation which enables us to understand certain things happening simultaneously or successively. All intuitions occur in time. We cannot take away time from phenomena, though we can well take away phenomena out of time. Time is consequently given a priori. It is the subjective condition under which alone intuitions can take place. Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever. Time has objective reality with reference to phenomena only because these are themselves things accepted as objects of our human senses. But time is no longer objective if the sensuous character of our intuitions is removed, for time is conditioned by our sense-perception and becomes real through it.

Let us listen to Kant's own statements about the g concept of time:

Die Zeit ist kein empirischer Begriff, der irgend von einer Erfahrung abgezogen worden

Die Zeit ist eine notwendige Vorstellung, die allen Anschauungen zum Grunde liegt . . . Die Zeit ist a priori gegeben.

⁷ Kant, KrV, B, 41,

⁸ Kant, KrV, B, 49-50,

⁹ Kant, KrV,B, 46-47,

¹⁰ Kant, KrV, B, 46.

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Der Raum stellet ger keine Figenechaft irrendern vor.
Diage an steh oder ale in ihrem Vernähtnis aufeinander vor.
d.i. reine Bestimmung derselben, die en Degenschaden selust
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subjektiven Bedingungen der Anschause anstrahlerte. Denn
reder absolute, noch relative Bestimmungen können vor dem
ibsetn der Diage, melchen die zukonnen, mithin nicht s
priord angenabent werden.

Tive is another a priori representation and an enables as to understand certain bhings happening simultaneously or successively. All immittions occur in them. We cannot take any theme are time from pouncement, though we can well take any theme are out of them. Time is done-outly given a priori. It is she subjective condition under which slone intuitions can take place. Time is the formal condition a priori of all take place. Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomens wintercever. Time has objective reality with reference to phenomens only decame these are themselves things accepted as objects of our inner senses. But time is no longer removed, for time is conditioned by our sense-perception and becomes real through it.

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Mant, Mry, S. 61,

Mante, Mrv, B, 49-50,

eland estate and

¹⁹ Kant, Krv, 8, 46.

Die Zeit ist die formale Bedingung a priori aller Erscheinungen überhaupt.11

Kant's notion of the categories of thought.

The human understanding transforms the raw material of our sense-experience and makes thus an articulate experience possible. This is done by the help of the categories of thought. These are immanent mental principles constituting the framework of thought and forming the contents of the pure reason. They are nothing which can be shown to the senses, but they are manifested in the mental product. They are not principles which the mind uses to know with, but they determine the form of knowing. There are various kinds of categories, e.g. Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality, etc. All of them underlie human experience and make it possible. The human mind would not be mind unless these principles are "erworben." i.e. "aus implied in it. The categories are den dem Geiste eingepflanzten Gesetzen abstrahiert. They are "nicht von den Empfindungen der Sinne abstrahiert," and have their source "in der Natur der Seele" as "intellektuale Vorstellungen."

Kant's conception of reason.

The human reason fulfil's the task of uniting all the sense-data of experience and bringing them into inner unity. 13

Alle unsere Erkenntnis hebt von den Sinnen an, und geht von da zum Verstande und endigt bei der Vernunft, über welche nichts Höheres in uns angefroffen wird, den

¹¹ Kant; KrV, B, 50.

¹² Kant, KrV, B, 50; Kant an M. Herz, 21 Febr. 1772.

Die late ist die formelle Hedlende a priori etc

. Januard to nelcomesce out to anison attrest outelrance and colime as suda easier but constraint-same and To selvoyedes out to glot end to soon at shir . eldiagon thought. These are immenont must bringiples constituting pure needed, They are ablaing which den or stown to the seners ved they are confidenced to the mantal product. They are new principles with the mind uses to the will, out they determine one form of knowing. Tiers are verices ideas of osteguries, e.g. quantity, Our. ity, Relation, Modellby, etc. . glole son it exam bne some example the next to Dia bun" to. 1 ". neurowes" sie esteopetes any . at mi beligni. den dem Geistereinuepflansten Gesetzen abstraniert." They bue ".troldeutern eanig reb der montland och mar idein" end

Cambits conception of reason.

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Alle unsere Arkenntnis hebt von den Sibnen en, und neht von de zum Verstende und enligt bei der Vernunft, fren selche michte Höheres is uns engetroffen wird, den

11 Mant; May, B, 50.

12 Mant, Mry, B, 50; Mant an M. Herr, 21 Febr. 1972,

13 Mant, Mry, B, 555.

Stoff der Anschauung zu bearbeiten und unter die höchste Einheit des Denkens zu bringen.

Reason is able to unite the raw material of our sensation on account of its innate rational ideas of an "I", "World," and "God." The "I" contained in reason builds up its own world. This world of thought is of course subjective and conditioned by the "I." But it transcends the mere world of phenomena in regarding God as the ultimate ground for the "I" and for the existence of the "World." Reason is both rational and practical. It includes the whole of life.

A special task of reason is the formation of the synthetical judgments a priori. The material for it is taken from experience as brought together into a synthesis, but its form and its universal validity are due solely to the 14 human reason. To these synthetical judgments a priori belongs the principle of the sufficient reason. Everything that exists must have a sufficient reason for its existence. There is a reason behind everything. Very closely connected with that is the principle of causality which Kant puts into 15 the following formulation:

Alles was geschieht (anhebt zu sein), setzt etwas voraus, worauf es nach einer Regel folgt.

The principle of causality has only validity in the realm of experience, and even here it is not absolute and without exceptions but a mere description of the observed regularity of events.

¹⁴ Kant, KrV, B, 197. 15 Kant, KrV, B, 258.

Stoff der Engelmenne zu beerheiten und unter die höchste und neter des Denkens zu bringen.

Reason is sole to unite the rew meterial of our senset on an "I", senset on scount of its innets retional ideas of an "I", "World," and "God." The "I" contained in reason builds up its ern world. This world of thought is of course ambjective and conditioned by the "I." But it transcense the mere world of phenomens in regarding God as the ultilate grand for the "I" and for the existence of and "World." Resson is poth rectional and practical. It includes the whole of life.

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¹⁶ Kent, MrV, B, 191.

A criticism of the Kantian epistemology, negative and positive.

Negative. Kant's epistemology contains a lot of weak points and even contradictions. He must have felt that himself because he changed his epistemology at various times in different important points. Even between the time of the first and the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781 - 1787) one can notice such a change of thought. Kant's system of epistemology never reached the point where it was free from contradictions.

But he went never so far as to deny the existence of the corporeal world, of a spiritual being, and of supersensory beings. He only claimed that it was impossible to penetrate rationally or intuitively into the metaphysical reality of the things.

Fichte saw in Kant an absolute idealist. But this is no adequate solution of Kant's attitude. Kant always assumed the reality of the "I." But even for this last assumption there is but little background in Kant's epistemology. In it the "I" seems to be just as much a mere subjective fiction of the human reason. It appears to be nothing more than a lopart of the subjective category of modality. That "I" am "I" seems to be in Kant's subjective criticism very problematical. That this is true seems to be so, but between seeming to be so and being so there is a fundamental difference.

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Morative. Heat's apistemology seatelns a let of mean points and even contradictions. He much have felt high black blacked, because he shenced its est temology at various times in attempt important points. Even between the time of the first and of the second edition of the Erick der reinen Vordunity and of the live! Live! - 1787) one can notice such a chance of thought. Heat's ayelem of entsteading never reached one point where it was a from contradictions.

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Consequently we would be justified in saying that it seems

"als ob" we were and seemingly form unique personalities.

This would lead us to Vaihinger's Als-Ob-Philosophie.

But even according to this philosophy everything exists only "als ob." Even Vaihinger's book, Die Philosophie des

Als-Ob,(1911) exists only "als ob" it were in reality, and his whole philosophy seems only as though it were a philosophy. It is as clear as the daylight that if the reality of the "I" is denied the whole philosophy leads in its last consequences to nihilism. This fatal result of Kant's philosophy is at the same time a neg-ative refutation of his whole epistemology. A system which leads to such deviations from the normal practical life cannot be real, if we want to uphold the possibility of knowledge at all.

Positive. The human consciousness is not satisfied with an Als-Ob-Philosophie for it strives toward positive goals. It demands a rebuilding of the Kantian epistemology and a possible correction of it. Such an attempt has to include the critical elements of Kant's epistemology and must start with the subject building up his own world.

Such a reconstruction of Kant's epistemology includes the following factors:

a) Trustworthiness of the human reason.

It has at its basis the presupposition that the human reason is truthworthy and able to understand the truth. This

Consequencing we would be justified in region that it seems "als ob" we were and seemingly form unique personalities.
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Such a reconstruction of Mano's episterology Ancient

a) Trustworthiness of the numen reason.

It has at its besis the presupposition that the human reason is truthworthy and able to anderstand the truth. This

holds true each time when the human reason understands the state of things with full evidence and with necessity.

b) The objectivity of space and time.

Through evidence I am certain that I am and that in me a number of realities take place. Thus I think, I will, I am sensitive to pain, etc. Furthermore I am conscious of the fact that these inner processes are not merely real, but that they last a certain time and that they extend over a certain space. My own consciousness is convinced through evidence that space and time are not mere sensations of my representations or intuitions. But this guarantees the objectivity of space and time.

c) The objectivity and the universality of the prin* ciple of causality.

The same consciousness informs us further about inner relations which exist between some inner processes in us.

Especially it notifies us with all certainty that some processes occur in succession of others. They stand in a relation of cause and effect to each other. Thus for example our consciousness observes that the motion of the hand is intended by the human will and caused by it; "and furthermore that the slowness and quickness, the force or weakness of this motion depends upon man's power of volition employed by its production. We are further conscious of the fact that not only the beginning but also the ending of an action is caused by the will determination. These insights lead us to the conclusion that

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the principle of causality is objectively valid.

Upon further reflexion it becomes evident that the law of causality is universally valid. Each thing and consequently also every newly arising process must have a sufficient reason for its existence. This sufficient ground could possibly lie within or without the arising process. But if we consider it closely we find that the sufficient reason cannot be found within the limits of the newly arising process alone. Otherwise a becoming process would exist as a sufficient ground for itself before being actual reality. It would have to be thought of as existing before it exists which would be a mere contradiction; for there is nothing which can be and not be at the same time. Consequently it has to lie outside of the process. Furthermore it must be something existing in order to be the sufficient reason for the existence of the originating process. Only an existence thing can be the reason for the existence of a new thing and thus be its cause. The reflective consciousness shows us clearly that everything that becomes reality presupposes a sufficient cause. This proves the objectivity of the principle of causality.

d) The existence of the external world.

We are further conscious of certain facts and processes which come upon us without our own doing and without our own will-determination. For example when I enter the room I become aware of tables, chairs etc., which have different colors, forms, height, length, breadth, etc. I might now do the best

the principle of canadity in cojectively valid. of newselfty is universally valid. Rech thing and consequently monney adolotiles a even team second galake glace grave ocla all this or bluos bearing sactalline state . sample he sait tol wighten or altender the grishing process. But if we consider it within the links of the newly adeing process those of this wise a seconing process would extat as a sufficient ground for itdispens ou of over bluow JI . Without Laurea galed eroton line incremes occur e se offer molife edaixe of stotae galdeixe se to said time. Vonsequently it mad to lie outside of the process. . succord galdeningles out to somedalke out tot moment inviolities - sucioenco svilociter ede . sauso soi pu suti bom pella com a presupposes a sufficient deuso. This proves the outentivity of one principle of deuselity.

d) mes existence of the outerhol world.

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I can in denying the reality of those things and in thinking them away or in giving them a different colour they actually have, - - but each time when I open my eyes I have the same sight and simply cannot help seeing the same form, colour, etc. The reality of those things is reflected in my mind and give me each time the same perception. For each of these perceptions our reflective consciousness tries to find a sufficient reason for its explanation. But this can be done according to the principle of causality. The cause of them cannot be found merely in the "I" which perceives them; but must be sought outside of it. Consequently there exist outside of my "I" things which stand in a relation of cause and effect to my "I." This proves the existence of an extra-mental or external world.

e) The character of the external world.

The human reason affirms only the reality of the external world. But it does not pass any judgments about its character. It might be spiritual, or corperal, supersensuous or sensuous, Divine or merely created. Out of this fact it becomes at once evident that we might regard the existence of the supersensory, spiritual or Divine just as much as standing in a causal relation to us as the existence of the sensuous and of merely created. It is only from the character of the causal influences that we can infer the character of the originator of those causes. The arguments for God are based

I can in denying the reality of those unings and in thinking from every or in diving them a different colour they actually nave, - - but each time when I open my eyes I have the name of the and simply emmor mann seeing the same form, colour, etc. The reality of those whings is reflected in my mind and give me such when the tame percention. For each of these perceptions can reflective consciousness tries to find a unifferent resson for its explanation. But this can be done according to the principle of causality. The cause of them cannot be form cannot are tund merely in the "I" which perceives aren't outside of thing which stand in a relation of cause and effect to my "I" things which stand in a relation of cause and effect to my "I" things which stand in a relation of cause and effect to my "I" things which stand in a relation of an extra-mental or external world.

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CHAPTER III

KANT'S GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOD

Kant's three general criticisms of the arguments for God and an evaluation of them.

Kant's general attitude toward the arguments

for God is expressed in the following quotation from the

Kritik der reinen Vernunft:

Ich behaupte nun, dass alle Versuche eines bloss spekulativen Gebrauchs der Vernunft in Ansehung der Theologie gänzlich fruchtlos und ihrer inneren Beschaffenheit nach null und nichtig sind; dass aber die Prinzipien ihres Naturgebrauches ganz und gar auf keine Theologie führen, folglich, wenn man nicht moralische Gesetze zum Grunde legt oder zum Leitfaden braucht, es überall keine Theologie der Vernunft geben könne. Denn alle synthetischen Grundsätze des Verstandes sind von immanentem Gebrauch, zu der Erkenntnis eines höchsten Wesens aber wird ein transzendenter Gebrauch derselben erfordert, wozu unser Verstand garnicht ausgerüstet ist.

The doubts raised by Kant in this quotation are general and yet the fundamental objections to all arguments for God. They are found again and again in Kant's own writings and might be summarized in the following three paragraphs:

a) Human reason is sense-bound and experience alone does not furnish us sufficient ground for a postulate of the Divine being.

Denn alle synthetischen Grundsätze des Verstandes sind von immanentem Gebrauch, zu den Erkenntnis eines höchsten Wesens aber wird ein transzendenter Gebrauch derselben erfordert, wozu unser Verstand garnicht ausgerüstet ist. Soll das empirischgültige Gesetz der Kausalität zu dem Urwesen führen, so musste dieses in die Kette der Gegenstände der Erfahrung mitgehören; alsdenn wäre es aber, wie alle Erscheinungen, selbst wiederum bedingt.

¹ Kant, KrV, B, 665. 2 Kant, KrV, B, 664.

the state of the actual terms along the second AND AND SCHOOL AND SERVICE AND ADDRESS OF WHEN A PARKET Action of the contract of the all the about the news the property of the state of the s told the series is semie-semies it comes danger (a . Third or Ly 14 action of a second delication of the second de . Ori sound the same that the series the contraction -March 201 and of the cast of the control of the co · All as a fill a street Lord, Tally D, and.

To this objection of Kant the following can be offered as a criticism to Kant's view: It is of course true that our thinking has to take its material from intuitions or from the experience of the world in and outside of us. One might even go so far as to say that all human thinking is accompanied by intuitive representations or even by human phantasies. But the thinking as such is not a mere sensuous intuition or representation, but a quite different mental activity, through which alone we understand inner relations and facts which mere sensuous intuitions or phantastic representations could never discover because of their mere sensuous character. The understanding can only reveal those laws because of its intellectual capacities. The laws and facts which are employed in all arguments for God are of rational nature and made by the human reason. All arguments for God stand in a close connection with the objective reality because they are built upon facts and laws founded upon reality. Since reason has the capacity to transcend the raw material of our sense-experience and to discover universally valid laws, we should be able to trust reason whenever it uses those facts in order to infer from them the Giver of all reality.

b) Erlaubte man aber auch den Sprung über die Grenze der Erfahrung hinaus vermittelst des dynamischen Gesetzes der Beziehung der Wirkungen auf ihre Ursachen, welchen Begriff kann uns dieses Verfahren verschaffen ?Bei weiten keinen Begriff von einem höchsten Wesen, weil uns Erfahrung niemals die grösste aller möglichen Würkungen, (als welche das Zeugnis von ihrer Ursache ablegen soll), darreicht.

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versche ges Feugnis von ihrer Urseche solesen soll), der

Against this statement of Kant one can hold to the opinion that the laws and facts derived from our sense-data give us certain keys to the understanding of the ultimate cause of them. The things of nature contain a great number of laws which give us a key to the understanding of the most high being as its originator. Those laws are hidden to the senses, but are revealed to men by the understanding. They give us a sufficient basis for affirming an eternal being. Though they are by no means complete, they still are a good beginning to start with.

c) Der Grundsatz, von dem, was geschieht, (dem Empirischzufälligen), asl Wirkung auß eine Ursache zu schliessen, ist ein Prinzip der Naturerkenntnis, aber nicht der spekulativen. Denn wenn man von ihm als einem Grundsatze, der die Bedingung möglicher Erfahrung überhaupt enthält, abstrahiert, und indem man alles Empirische weglässt, ihn vom Zufälligen überhaupt aussagen will, so bleibt nicht die mindeste Rechtfertigung eines solchen synthetischen Satzes übrig, um daraus zu ersehen, wie ich von etwas, was da ist, zu etwas davon ganz Verschiedenem (genannt Ursache) übergehen könne: ja der Begriff einer Ursache verliert ebenso, wie des Zufälligen, in solchem bloss spekulativen Gebrauche alle Bedeutung, deren objektive Realität sich in concreto begreiflich machen liesse.4

All arguments for God rest upon the supposition of the universal validity of the law of causality, but this can only be proved as being valid to the phenomenal realm of experience. Man cannot prove its transcendental validity and reality. This common objection of Kant has already been dealt with in the previous chapter in connection with his epistemology.

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All arguments for fed was appropriately, but this can the universal validity of the can appropriately, but this can only in proved at ording walld to the preparation of the transcondental validity and results. This common ordering of them has already been and the transcondental validity and reals the common ordering and the common side of the common sid

A general survey of Kant's critical treatment of the different arguments for God.

Kant expresses his general oponion about the different arguments for God in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, where be states:

Es sind nur drei Beweisarten vom Dasein Gottes aus spekulativer Vernunft möglich. Alle Wege die man in dieser Absicht einsclagen mag, fangen entweder von der bestimmten Erfahrung und der dadurch erkannten besonderen Beschaffenheit unserer Sinnenwelt an und steigen von ihr nach Gesetzen der Kausalität bis zur höchsten Ursache ausser der Welt hinauf; oder sie legen nur unbestimmte Erfahrung, d.i. irgend ein Dasein empirisch zum Grunde; oder sie abstrahieren endlich von aller Erfahrung und schliessen gänzlich a priori aus blossen Begriffen auf das Dasein einer höchsten Ursache. Der erste Beweis ist der physikotheologische, der zweite der kosmologische, der dritte der ontologische Beweis. Mehr gibt es ihrer nicht, und mehr kann es auch nicht geben.

Want rejects the ontological argument as one based upon mere empty concepts. He objects to the teleological argument because it can at best only lead to a wise architect of the world, but not to an eternal, infinite, and almighty God. The cosmological argument can lead according to Kant only to a necessary being, but not to its infinity. God's infinity cannot be proved, and if it were attempted it would be nothing else but an analysis of an empty and abstract concept. The moral argument is one of the practical aspect of our reason. We assume the reality of God because of the practical significance of such a belief for the whole of life, but we do not have a theoretical proof of its validity. The

⁵ Kant, Krv, B, 618.

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Heart supre see his general aponion about the different arguments for God in the Arith der reinem Vernunit, where is ester:

Es sind nur drei Seweiserten vom Desein Gottes aus spekuleriver Vernünft mörlich. Alle Wege die man in dieser Ansten Erfahrung und der dadurch erkennten beschderen etimmten Erfahrung und der dadurch erkennten beschderen Bescheft unsein der Anweslicht die zur börneten Vrasche nach Geseisen der Hauselicht die zur börneten Vrasche aus er Welt hinauf; oder sie legen nur unbestimmte Erfahrung, d.i. irgend ein Dassin empirisch zum Grunde; oder sie abstrahten endlich von aller Erfahrung und schliessenschneiten erfahrung und das Dassin einer höchsten Vrasche. Der orste Beweis ist der physikotheologische, der zweite der kromologische, der dritte der ontologische Beweis. Mehr gibt es ihrer nicht, und mehr kann es auch nicht geben.

Mant rejects the ontological argument as one based upon mere empty concepts. He objects to the relecological argument because it can at bost only lead to a wise architect of one sorld, but not to an etersal, infinite, and simighty God. The cosmological argument can lead according to Mant only to a necessary being, but not to its infinity. God's infinity cannot os proved, and if it sere attempted it would be nothing else but an enalysis of an empty and abstract concept. The morel argument is one of the practical aspect of our reason. We assume the reality of God because of one practical aspect of our reason at a seame the reality of God because of the practical aignificance of such a belief for the whole of life, but we do not have a theoretical proof of its validity. The

scientific demonstration of God is to be denied, but there is reason enough to assume God's existence if it can be shown that the belief in Him is necessary for the practical life of man. Kant holds that the moral nature of man requires the existence of God.

Kant's criticism of the theistic arguments is justified in many ways, though not in all respects. The whole of his criticism rests upon his epistemology and really stands or falls with it.

Kant's personal faith and its basis.

It is not strange at all that Immanuel Kant devoted so much of his time and energy to theological questions. His parents were both very picus people and devout members of the pietistic church in Germany. His father exemplified the virtues of industry and truthfulness. He was a man of high moral standard. His chief interest was to make his children hardworking and upright. But Kant's mother was far more ardently and emotionally religious, and seems to have had a far more forceful personality than her husband. Her main interest was to educate her children in the love and in the fear of God. She was a woman of natural intelligence and of great genuine piety.

Kant stood under the influence of pietism, and while in his home he encountered pietism at its best. Later on in his schools he learned from his classmates the other side of pietism to which many of his classmates adapted themselves. spinelfic immonantition of tool to to domind, out them alone is a space, and the season and the season of the seas

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This was a form of hypocrisy. When young and active boys are expected unanimously and daily to give evidence of great religious fervour, they are bound to do so without observing strict proportion to the emotion actually felt. Kant's earlyacquired honesty saved him from such short-cuts to favor. Kant was unable to acquire a taste for that affected form of piety and must have regarded it as a youthful slavery. He acquired a lasting abhorrence of all religious emotions and did not want to have anything to do with the singing of hymns and the saying of prayers for the rest of his life. After reaching maturity, he never attended church services; he even took special pains to avoid them. He rebelled against certain practices of the Lutheran church, but he did not turn against religion altogether. It was probably the memory of his home and the acquaintance With men like Schultz and Knutsen that kept alive in him the relative sanity and justice of his mature estimate of pietism.

An a man of the Enlightenment Kant was a strong advocate of the right and duty of every man to judge for himself in religious as well as in secular matters. His motto was, have courage to make use of your own intellect! Consequently he subjected religion to the same criticism as any other field of human experience. He reasearches in the field of the theoretical reason led him to the belief that from the empirical stand-point the existence of God and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved, since both lie completely beyond the

^{6.} Greene, RLR, xxviii sq.

⁷ Paulsen, KLD, 28.

⁸ Kant to M. Mendelsoohn, April 8, 1766.

This sas a lorn of hypocrisy. When young and active boys are natvisace faculty or ob or bound ore your rowers and interest strice proportion to the emotion actually felt. Kant's sari-. Tovel of sino-inode date mont with bever wisened bevience old wast have regarded it as a youthlyl clavery. He reall , elil in to Jest end not areyord to pulpes, end bus resenting memility, he never actended ourses gainseer mistres jeniage polices of .meds blove or aming felonge Moor January name of the Lutheren course, but he delice to sections religion altonesher. It was probably the memory of his home .maldely to estimate equiam

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V Paulsen, MD, 25,

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range of experience. This would lead to skepticism. But Kant had too high an estimate for religion as to deny its unique influence upon the whole of life. He therefore came to the conclusion that although the theoretical reason cannot demonstrate its truth, religion has a unique place in life. On the moral consciousness is founded the absolutely necessary conviction of the existence of God as the ruler of the kingdoms of reason and nature, who establishes the necessary harmony demanded by the moral consciousness between moral worth and happiness.

Kant himself was educated and brought up in the pietistic movement in Germany which stood closely related with the Lutheran church, - - in fact was believed to be a revival of the spirit of Dr. Martin Luther. The Lutheran church holds to the belief that God is an almighty and sovereign being ruling over the world. He is an infinite being and thus stands to an epen contrast with man as a finite being. It was this belief in the Divine infinitude that caused a lot of trouble to Kant in his arguments for God, for there is no argument which can prove the Divine infinity. All of them could possibly lead to a finite God, but not to the God of the traditional Lutheran church.

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CHAPTER IV

KANT AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD

Kant's treatment of the ontological argument.

The ontological argument concludes from the conception of God as a most real being to his existence, since necessary existence belongs in the class of realities, and is therefore contained in the conception of the most real being. Kant here disputes the assumption that being is a real predicate. According to him the conception of an absolutely necessary being is a conception of the pure reason. It is a mere idea of the objective reality which is not proved at all by the fact that reason requires it.

Kant rejects the idea thatbeing is a real predicate by adding which to other predicates the sum of realities may be increased. The comparison says Kant between a being possessing other predicates, but not being and a being combining with these predicates that of being, and hence by so much greater, more perfect, or more real than the former, is absurd. Whenever a being is affirmed, the object is posited with all its predicates. This is the meaning of being. But when a being is not affirmed - - or, what is exactly the same thing, when the object is not thus posited - - no conclusion can be drawn from the conception of the object to its predicates.

¹ Kant, KrV, B, 620. 2 Kant, KrV, B, 625.

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Mant, Mry, B, 620.

Kant himself argues:

Der Begriff ist allemal möglich, wenn er sich nicht widerspricht. Das ist das logische Merkmal der Möglichkeit, und dadurch wird sein Gegenstand vom nihil negativum unterschieden. Allein er kann nichtsdestoweniger ein leerer Begriff sein, wenn die objektive Realität der Synthesis, dadurch der Begriff erzeugt wird, nicht besonders dargetan wird; welches aber jederzeit, wie oben gezeigt worden, auf Prinzipien möglicher Erfahrung und nicht auf dem Grundsatze der Analysis (dem Satze des Widerspruches) beruht. Das ist eine Warnung, von der Möglichkeit der Begriffe (logische) nicht sofort auf die Möglichkeit der Dinge (reale) zu schliessen.

There is already a contradiction in introducing the concept of existence into the concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility of existence. We must always ask is this or that thing whose existence we presume an analytic or a synthetic proposition. If it is analytic, the assertion of the existence of the being adds nothing to the thought of the thing. In that case either the thought in us about it is the thing itself or we have presupposed an existence as belonging to the realm of the possible. We would then have inferred its existence from its internal possibility but that is nothing else but tauto-

Hence in reasoning to the existence of God, if being is to be demonstrated as a predicate, being must already have been assumed. We arrive consequently only at a pitiful tautology. This tautological conclusion would be identical, hence an analytical proposition, but the assertion that God is, is, like all existential propositions a synthetical one and consequently

4 Kant, KrV, B, 626.

³ Kant, KrV, B, 623, Ahmerkung.

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per segriff let allemal melloh, wenn er sich plont widersprient, Des ist das logische Werkentl der ieglichkeit, and dadurch wird sein derenstand vom albil neustlumit untersehteden. Albin er kam nientsdestoweniger ein lenter Begriff sein, wenn die objektive Honlicht der Synthesiste dadur in der Sentiff erseugt wird, micht besauders datgeben wird; welches aber goderseit, wie oben geseigt unterseht wird; welches aber goderseit, wie oben geseigt untersensten dem demndsatze der Analysis (dem setze des Widersproches) anders ist eine Wernung, von der Möglichkeit der Bagriffe (logische) micht sofer anf die Möglichkeit der Dinge (reale) zu schliesen.

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can only be demonstrated a priori in regard to a noumenon.

All existential propositions are synthetic and their predicate

of existence could be rejected without any contradiction.

Being is no real predicate at all; for it is a concept of something that could not be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations as existing in themselves. Logically it is nothing else but the copula of a judgment.

Der Satz 'Gott ist allmächtig,' enthält zwei Begriffe, die ihre Objekte haben: Gott und Allmacht; das Wörtchen "ist" ist nicht noch ein Prädikat obenein, sondern nur das, was das Prädikat beziehungsweise aufs Subjekt setzt.

Nothing is added to my concept. The content is one and the same. The "ist" expresses only the relation of objects.

Or to express the same thought in different words, the real contains no more than the merely possible.

Hundert wirkliche Taler enthalten nicht das Mindeste mehr als hundert mögliche. Denn da diese den Begriff, jene aber den Gegenstand und dessen Position an sich selbst bedeuten, so würde, im Falle dieser mehr enthielte als jener, mein Begriff nicht den ganzen Gegenstand ausdrücken und auch nicht der angemessene Begriff von ihm sein. Aber in meinem Vermögenszustande ist mehr bei hundert wirklichen Talern als bei dem blossen Begriff derselben (d.i. ihrer Möglichkeit). Denn der Gegenstand ist bei der Wirklichkeit nicht bloss in meinem Begriffe analytisch enthalten, sondern kommt zu meinem Begriffe, (der eine Bestimmung meines Zustandes ist), synthetisch hinzu, ohne dass auch dieses Sein ausserhalb meinem Begriff diese gedachten hundert Taler selbst im mindesten vermehrt werden.

Kent rejects the ontological argument for God because the idea of a perfect being does not imply the existence of that being. Mere idea does not involve existence. An imaginary

⁵ Kant, KrV, B, 626.

Kant, KrV,B, 626-7. Kant, KrV,B, 627.

osm only be demonstrated a priori in regard to a nounchon.

All exterential propositions are synthetic and their predicate
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Taler without being real. The idea does not involve existence.

No single idea carries with it its own proof. There is a

fundamental difference between the idea and the reality of
that idea.

The ontological argument for God has no validity, for 8 from a mere concept of God one cannot infer his existence.

Ein Mensch möchte wohl ebensowenig aus blossen Ideon an Einsichten reicher werden, als ein Kaufmann an Vermögen, wenn er, um seinen Zustand zu Verbessern, seinem Kassenbestande einige Nullen anhängen wollte.

A criticism of Kant's treatment of the ontological argument and a reconstruction of it.

Kant is quite right in rejecting the notion that the idea of a perfect being implies its existence. Between idea and reality there is a gulf which logic cannot overbridge.

The idea of God is one thing and God Himself is another thing. All human thoughts are subjective and not even always free from error. Reality is something deeper than thought - - man can not always understand it in all details. There is something in reality ever and above the idea of it. It is concrete and individual. There is a unique element in existence which transcends human thought. Reality cannot be reduced to human reason, - - it is something beyond it.

On the other hand there are certain elements of truth in the ontological arguments which Kant overlooked. It is an

inquiert Taler may have all the qualities of a real funder.

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expression of our faith in the reality of the ideal. The the ideal must be everlasting real. Man believes in the reality of the ideal and of values in general. The ontological argument expresses faith in the objectivity of value. "It sketches the supreme hypothesis for thought to test." It is a faith in the reality of the ideal which dwells in all men and appears to be a consensus gentium.

Furthermore the ontological argument expresses "our intellectual desire for completeness in our conceptions. But 100 here we do not begin with an idea separated from reality," and proceed then to argue that this idea must necessarily include reality. This desire for completeness implies that the idea has reality from the first, both in my own idea and as based on an apprehension of a reality other than the idea, whether of the internal or of the external world.

The ontological argument expresses an aspiration of perfection. The perfect is to be real, and men must be able to understand it.

Finally it has to be pointed out that there is not necessarily such an impassible gulf between the Creator and the created. Man is not a mere empty space; but he has the capacity to understand things. Even a revelation from God can only be preserved so far as it is understood by men.

Professor Dr. Kroner expressed this thought in his lecture ll to the seminar in Kant's Religious Philosophy, when he stated

⁹ Brightman, Outline to PHR, (1935-36), 27.

¹⁰ Sorley, MVIG, 515. 11 Minutes from Kant's PHR, Session xii, January 8,1956.

. say . Acadd one to wallest saw at malet you to notsmerate ideal must be everlasting real. Men believes in the reality or the ideal and or values in general. The ontological ergument expresses falsh in the objectivity of value. "It diste the same appears to the thought to beat." It is a and appears to be a consensus gentlum.

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Brighman, Outline to PER, (leve-vo), 27.

"The mind can alone be seized if it seizes that which seizes it".. Philosophical theology has found "that if the mind itself is to be seized by that which it did not create, it must have a God that it itself does not create. This was the reason for the old ontological argument which claimed that its idea of God was not produced, but was received."

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CHAPTER V

KANT AND THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD

Kant's treatment of the cosmological argument.

Kant writes in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft that the cosmological argument has the following form:

Wenn etwas existiere, so muss auch ein schlechterdingsnotwendiges Wesen existieren. Nun existieren zum mindesten ich selbst; also existiert ein absolutnotwendiges Wesen.

The first part of this statement contains the common fact of experience from which we infer an absolutely necessary being. The cosmological argument is based on the most common fact of experience. It is therefore not ontological or a priorisince the cosmos is the object of all possible experiences. Kant calls this the cosmological argument for God. The cosmological argument is dependent upon an indefinite experience while the conceptual argument stresses the meaning of the world and its purpose is considered by the teleological argument. The cosmological argument regards the world as an effect. It holds to the notion of causal or dynamical ground of the world which is finally identified as being God. The unity of the world ground is conditioned by God.

The cosmological argument proceeds then as follows:

The necessary being can be determined in one way only, namely,

by one out of each possible pair of opposed predicates. It is

therefore completely determined by its own concept. But there

¹ Kant, Krv, B, 603.

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is only one concept possible which determines a thing completely a priori. That is the concept of the ens realissimum. This concept of the ens realissimum is consequently the only concept through which a necessary being can be thought. In other words, a supreme being necessarily exists. Kant holds that

In diesem kosmologischen Argumente kommen so viel vernünftelnde Grundsätze zusammen, dass die speculative Vernunft hier all ihre dialektische Kunst aufgeboten zu haben scheint, um den grösstmöglichen transcendentalen Schein zu Stande zu bæingen.

The speculative reason making use of its dialectical skill produced in the cosmological argument the greatest possible transcendental illusion. Kant admits that the cosmological argument is based on experience. Since it makes its stand on experience it is distinct from the ontological proof, which puts its entire trust into pure a priori concepts But the cosmological proof really used experience only in one single step in the whole argumentation, namely, to conclude the existence of a necessary being. Kant holds that reason abandons experience altogether in the latter part of the argument. Thus the empirical premiss tells us what properties this postulated being has or may have. But reason is bold enough to endeavour to discover from mere concepts what properties an absolutely necessary being must have. The speculative reason finds out which among possible things contains in itself the conditions - requisitas - - essential to

² Kant, Krv, B, 653-54.

⁵ Kant, KrV, B, 654.

⁴ Kant, Krv,B, 654.

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The spond to the cosmological argument the greatest seal of tradecod in the cosmological argument the presentation has comits that the cosmological argument is based on experience. Since it mikes the legical argument is based on experience in the disclared from the enteriorists of proof, this much its empire tract into pure a priori concepts for the cosmological proof really used experience only in one single step in the whole erganentation, namely, to conclude the experience of a necessary being, what holds that reason aboutons experience altegather in the labor pure pure of the experience altegather in the labors pure of the properties that the experience altegather in the labors what the this cosmistion being into or may have. But reason is propertied another to discover decamere concepts what the properties an evaluation because when the experience of the expension of the comparing the time of the contests what it itself the conditions. The manner reason that continuely necessary wathe past have. The sponding in the first conditions. The manner contests the latter reason that continuely necessary wather posterials of these contains and itself the conditions. The manner of the contains and itself the conditions.

Tune, Evy, 8, 608-50.

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absolute necessity. The cosmological argument holds that these are nowhere to be found save in the concept of the ens realissimum. The conclusion is therefore drawn that the ens realissimum is the absolutely necessary being. Kant points out that it is evident that we are here presupposing that the concept of the highest reality is completely adequate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence. The cosmological argument presupposes that the existence of an ens realissimum can be inferred from our concept thereof.

From mere concepts one can infer the thinkability of something but not the absolute necessity of its existence. If I say:

Der Begriff des entis realissimi ist ein solcher Begriff und zwar der einzige, der dem notwendigen Dasein passend und ihm adaquat ist, so muss ich auch einräumen, dass aus ihm das letztere geschlossen werden könne. Es ist also eigentlich nun der ontologische Beweis aus lauter Begriffen, der dem sogenannten kosmologischen Beweis alle Beweiskraft enhält, und die angebliche Erfahrung ist ganz müssig, vielleicht, um uns nur auf den Begriff der absoluten Notwendigkeit zu führen, nicht aber um diese an einem irgend bestimmten Dinge darzutun.

Kant admits that experience may lead us the the concept of absolute necessity, but he holds that it is unable to demonstrate this necessity as belonging to any determinate thing.

In summarizing the cosmological argument and Kant's treatment of it one might say that the cosmological argument concludes from the fact that anything exists to the existence of an absolutely necessary being, which being, by the aid of

⁵ Kant, KrV, B, 655.

⁶ Kant, Krv, B, 655.

phociacs maps sing. The cosmological argument holds that when when are nowhere to be found save in the concept of the sustantiation. The conclusion is therefore drawn that the ensured and the concept of the bighest reality is completely adequated and the concept of the bighest reality is completely adequate to the cencept of abscumbe accessing of existence. The cosmological argument presumed accessing of existence of an are consepts one the inferred from our concept that the centers the existence of an are consepts one can their the binderbility of sometime can be inferred from our concept the charteness of the context of the concepts one can their the binderbility of sometime can be because of the charteness. If

per Begriff and swar day elastic realization ist ein goloher Begriff und swar day elastic, so muss top such elaranden, days eus inm addouet ist, so muss top such elaranden, days eus elecablich num day ontologische Beweis en lauter Pogriffen, der dem sogenenden kommologische Beweis en lauter gementen der engenichen kommologischen Beweis day alle Geweischent, und die engeniche Erichtung ist auf gens müssig, vielletont, und die engeniche Erichtung ist auf gens müssig, vielletont, un uns nur auf den Begriff der absoluten Mohenuningen in ihren bestingten Diogs dermann.

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In summerizing the cosmological ergusent and Hent's treatment of it one wight sey that the cosmological ergument concludes from the fact that anything existence of an absolutely necessary ceing, which ceing, by the ald of

⁵ Kent, Krv, B, 200.

the ontological argument, is then identified with God as the most real or perfect being (ens realissimum or perfectissimum). Kant, on the contrary denied that the principles which regulate the use of reason justify us in prolonging the chain of causes beyond the sphere of experience; but, he adds, if the argument did really conduct to an extramundane and absolutely necessary cause, it would not demonstrate that this cause is the absolutely perfect being of the traditional church. Besides that to take refuge to the ontological argument is shown to be inadmissible by the demonstrated invalidity of the latter.

A criticism of Kant's treatment of the cosmological argument.

Kant's treatment of the cosmological argument stands in contrast to that of the theistic philosophy. This becomes evident when we consider the main points of the latter, to which most of the theistic philosophers would agree:

Men exist at present who could not have inhabited the inhabited the world eternally. Whence do they come? One could answer that they descend from father and mother, and the latter again from their parents etc. Thus we would have an unbroken chain of human descent. But this chain must have a beginning. Natural science tells us that there was once a time when no man could have existed because the means to the maintenance of life were lacking. Consequently there must

the ontological argument, is then identified with nod as the most real or perfection; and the perfection of many). Asai, on the conversy dealed then the principles which remails to the use of researt, hastily as in prolougiar the about the square of experious; but, he said, if the original the sphere of experious; but, he said, if the original did not demonstrate that the lately necessary oscae, it would not demonstrate that that ocuse is the gheological perfect ocing of the traditional church. Hestides what is shown to be incimisable by the demonstrated invitational disport the intime.

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unarched chain of human descent. But this chain must have a
beginning. Macural sulence beils us that there was once a
che when no man could have existed bedause the means to

have been a time when human beings began to exist and started to gain their livelihood. But whence did they come and what iw the origin of life in general?

There are two different answers possible. First of all one could say that life originated from matter. It is matter entered into existence. Matter is self-sustaining and existing by itself. Life is a new form of it. But how could matter transform itself into life, if it is dead and indifferent to the forms of existence? Natural science informs us that the existing material has its own definite extension, form, position, and relation to other atoms of the same matter. If it is in motion it has its own special form, direction, and intensity in its motions. In other words atoms occur either in a solid, liquid, or gaseous state of aggregation and their motion is determined by it. Mere atoms as such are indifferent and neutral to any state of aggregation, form, direction, and intensity in their motions. Atoms cannot exist separately; they must be connected with others. Matter cannot exist without a definite extension, form, position in space and without having its own state of aggregation. A material atom without any form, position etc, cannot exist. These laws are presuppositions for any kind of exixtence. Mere matter would be neutral and indifferent and as such lack the necessary presuppositions for existence. As wuch it does not contain the cause of existence. There must

have been a time when human beings began to exist and started to gets their livelihood. But whence did they come and what is the critis of like in gameral?

There ere one different answers possible. First of al di . rettam mort perenigiro cuil dant yes bluce eno liu unlated ar - "Leb et redach. consistine osni berevne resign and extending of them is a new lore of it. But now so smode reduce of normaler bas ancioleng amo's ancientate the same matter. If it is in metten it has its own special form, direction, and intendity in its motions, in colors worls spons occur sither in a solid, liquid, or garaous sinte of erok , of yo penimereb at notion tieds but notisgerage employ, form, obrection, and intensity in their moulines. orderes. Metter cancet exist without a definite bacecason, form, postulon is appear and viruout having its own active of aggrangion, a material atom without any rorm, position ato; dennet exist. These laws are presuppositions for any kind or ons dispositional bas istruct of bluck redam or of . somes the as econstate tol manual transport the told will also exercises as men it does not contein the cause of existence. There wast

be something else which makes existence possible.

Since life is not contained in pure matter as such, it must have been originally outside of it. There must have existed outside of the material world a being which sustains matter and put life into it. This being cannot be mere matter for as such it could not contain in itself the coause of life. It must be an eternally spiritual being or an ens aetermum. This being must be of eternal duration, for if it were not such, we could ask the question, from whom did this being originate and why at this special time and not at any other? These questions can never be answered and create more difficulties than they solve. We have to accept God's existence as eternal. He is an eternal, spiritual, and rational being who sustains and originated the world.

The question whether matter exists eternally is whether it was created in time by this Divine being, is a very subordinate question for the cosmological argument. It does not matter at all whether it is a finite or an infinite series of dependence from the Divine originator. Kant's assertion that the cosmological argument infers

von der Unmöglickkeit einer unendlichen Reihe über einander gegebener Ursachen in der Sinnenwelt auf eine erste Ursache.

is not quite true.

The cosmological argument is not able to demonstrate the infinitude of God, but is a sufficient argument for a finite God.

⁷ Kant, KrV, B, 658.

State life the contitued in pure metter as such, stated the pure metter as such, it must have been entrinally contitue of it. Where must have entured outside of the meterial worlds being which custime matter and publifie into it. Whis paing connect be meterial for as such as such it could not contain in itself the case of life. It wist is one if the contain the interest in in itself the case of life. It wist is one of life. It wist is and the contained being or an entured. This refug must be or stemmal curretion, for if it was not such originate and the substitute of the same did whis being there questions out never be answered and create more difficult colors and they solve, We have to accept God's endatence as observed, he is an stemmal, and relicant colors.

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CHAPTER VI

KANT AND THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD

Kent's attitude toward the teleological argument in in his pre-critical period.

During his pre-critical period Kant dealt with the teleological argument in two of his writings. These are the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, which was published in 1755 and Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, which appeared in 1765.

Hant's treatment of the teleological argument in his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels. This work of Kant appeared anonymously. It is dedicated to Frederick the second. The fundamental philosophical idea of the work is the compatibility of a mechanical explanation of nature, which, without arbitrary limitations, seeks in all cases a natural cause in place of other causes, with a teleology which views all nature depending on God. He develops in this work his Weltbildungstheorie. He asserts that our solar systems originated from an eternally old vaporous mass, which began to shape itself into balls. The collision of the masses caused the side motions. Our whole planetary system is consequently the result of the activity of pure mechanistic laws, which work autonomously without any interference of an external

CHAPTER VI

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Agentic treatment of the telephological argument in his alignmented a teatropy and whom the state of the stat

intelligence. Kant dealt with this question: Does this new theory contradict the assertion of the Scriptures where God is the sustainer and creator of the world? The Scriptures hold that He alone is the the giver and preserver of unity and purpose in the cosmos. Kant himself says:

Wenn ich diesen Vorwurf gegründet fände, so ist die Überzeugung, die ich von der Unfehlbarkeit göttlicher Wahrheiten habe, bei mir so vermögend, dass ich alles, was ihnen widerspricht, durch sie für genugsam widerlegt halte und verwerfen würde.

But he is convinced that his theory stands in harmony with the Scriptures and the teleogical argument for God. He 2. says:

Die Materie, die der Urstoff aller Dinge ist, ist also an gewisse Gestze gebunden, welchen sie frei überlassen, notwendig schöne Verbindungen hervorbringen muss. Sie hat keine Freiheit, von diesem Plane der Vollkommenheit abzuweichen. Da sie also einer höchst weisen Absicht sich unterworfen befindet, so muss sie notwendig in solche übereinstimmende Verhältnisse durch eine über sie herrschende Ursache versetzt werden sein, und es ist ein Gott, eben deswegen, weil die Natur auch sich im Chaos nicht anders als regelmässig und ordentlich verfahren kann.

That the forces of nature themselves work intelligently, bears witness to the existence of an intelligent author
of nature. Matter is subject to certain laws. Nature working
in harmony with laws brings forth combinations of beauty. But
this very fact compels to assume the existence of God. For
how were it possible that things of vafious natures in
combination with each other should strive to effect such
exquisite accords and beauties, unless they owed a common
origin in an infinite mind, in which the essential qualities

¹ Kant, NTH, I, 222.

² Kant, NTH, I, 228.

intelligence. None docit with this question: Does ohis new heary contradict the assertion of the foreignness where Ood is the sustainer and creator of the world? The Suriptures neit that he alone is the the the giver and preserver of unity and purpose in the cosmos. Name hisself says:

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Mante Mills I. 220.

of all things were wisely planed?

Der eine Schluss ist ganz richtig; wenn in der Verfassung der Welt Ordnung und Schönheit hervorleuchten, so ist ein Gott. Allein der andere ist nicht weniger gegründet: wenn diese Ordnung aus allgemeinen Naturgesetzen hat hervorfliessen können, so ist die ganze Natur notwendig eine Wirkung der höchsten Weisheit.

If the inner nature of things were determined by an intrinsic necessity independently of each other, they would not, as a result of their natural tendencies, adjust themselves to each other, exactly as a reflecting, prudent choice would combine them. Since God works through nature there is harmony.

The toleological as Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes.

Eight years later Kant devoted a whole book to the teleological proof for God's existence. He called it: Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. It was published in 1703. The only possible proof for the existence of God is for Kant the teleological. There is an other possibility to prove the existence of God and that is by miracles, but this is only for those people who are unable to do profound thinking and simply believe what is told them to have occurred. Miracles are possible, i.e. thinkable, but we do not have information enough about them, to regard them as a definite proof for the existence of God.

The argument from the order and the purpose in nature is of entirely different character. It presupposes an insight and

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The argument from the order and one purpose in nature is of entrely different character. It presupposes an instant and

a deep understanding of the laws of nature. If one considers the intrinsic laws of nature one cannot help inferring from them the existence of a wise being that made and sustains them.

Die grosse Einheit in einem so weitläufigen Ganzen lässt abnehmen, dass nur ein einziger Urheber aller dieser Dinge sei, und wenngleich in allen diesen Schlüssen keine geometrische Strenge hervorblickt, so enthalten sie doch unstrittig so viel Nachdruck, dass sie einen jeden Vernünftigen nach Regeln, die die natürliche gesunde Vernunft befolgt, keinen Augenblick hierüber im Zweifel lassen.

The laws of nature are universally valid and necessary. They are the a prior presuppositions for the harmony and order in the universe. It is very easy to infer from them a unitary being as their source. Kant himself states that,

Am mehrsten enthält die Methode, über die vollkommenen Anstalten der Natur zu urteilen, den Geist wharer Weltweisheit, wenn sie jederzeit bereit, auch übernatürliche Begebenheiten zuzulassen, imgleichen die warhaftig künstlichen Anordnungen der Natur nicht zu verkennen, hauptsachlich die Abzielung auf Vorteile und alle Wohlgereimtheit, sich nicht hindern lässt, die Gründe davon in notwendigen, allgemeinen Gesetzen aufzusuchen, mit grosser Achtsamkeit auf die Erhaltung der Einheit und mit einer vernünftigen Abneigung, die Zahl der Naturursachen um deretwillen zu vervielfältigen. Wenn hierzu noch die Aufmerksamkeit auf die allgemeinen Regeln gefügt wird, welchen den Grund der notwendigen Verbindung desjenigen, was naturlicherweise ohne besondere Anstalt vorgeht, mit den Regeln des Vorteils oder der Anmehmlichkeit vernünftiger Wesen konnen begreiflich machen und man alsdann zu dem göttlichen Urheber hinaufsteigt, so erfüllt die physischteleologische Art zu urteilen ihre Pflicht gehörig.

Kant holds it possible to arrive at a proof of God by venturing on the dark ocean of metaphysics, whereas subsequently he undertock to demonstrate the impossibility of a theoretical proof for the existence of God. Already in this

⁴ Kant, BDG, 168.

⁵ Kant, BDG, 144.

a deep underswending of the laws of necure. If one constitue the the intrinsic laws of necure one cannot help inferring from the che existence of a wise being that made and succeins them.

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So venturing on the dark ocean of metrophysics, whereas acha venturing on the dark ocean of metrophysics, whereas acha to thinking the unitarious of demonstrate and impossibility of a
and the unitarious of consistence of food. Already in this

Mant, and, 100.

work Kant lays down the doctrine, that the existence is no predicate or specific attribute of anything. Through the fact of existence things do not receive another predicate in addition to those predicates which they have without existence as things simply possible. In the conception of any logical subject, now but predicates of possibility are even found. The existence of a thing is an absolutely positing of the thing, and is therefore distinguished from all predicates, which as such are never posited otherwise than relatively to some things. It is impossible that nothing should exist; for then the material and the data for all that is possible would be removed, and hence all possibility would be negatived; but that by which all possibility is destroyed is absolutely impossible. This argumentation of Kant is nothing else but a mere paralogism. The assertion of the absence of all possibility of existence is, indeed, identical with the assertion of the impossibility of existence, but not with the assertion of the impossibility of the supposed absence of all possibility. Kant continues his argumentation in concluding that there must exist something in an absolutely manner. This necessary being is one, because it contains the ultimate real ground or reason of all other possible beings. Hence every other thing must depend upon it. It is simple, not compounded of numerous substances. It is the eternity of the universal cause under the same form. But

ord Hand lays form the doctrine, that the cal section presidence or appointed accribute of anyming, whereast con manatha induly eval tend dothy established stoll or moisiabn As chings simply possible. It the conception of any logical subject, no. It predicates of possibility are even found. stang, and is timestore distinguished from all presidents to sowe things, it is imposmiole that nothing should exhalt rould be removed, and homes all you intility to id be segaspecially impossible. This arrangement of the is not thing also but a more paralogism. The samethon of the absence of all possibility of existence is, induced, identical the al milatin mugas the countrop then . willidizing the lo manner. This necessary being is one, because it contains beings. Hence every other thing much depond upon it. It is add at IT . seemaded of numerous substances. It is the starting of the universal osuse the same form, Eut

already in this work Kant expresses the belief that those precious convictions which are most necessary for our happiness are not at the mercy of subtle reasonings, but are given directly to the natural vulgar understanding. At the close of the book, Der einig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, Kant states,

Es ist durchaus notig, dass man sich vom Dasein Gottes überzeige; es ist aber nicht ebenso notig, dass man es demonstriere.

Kant's attitude toward the teleological argument during his critical period. Kant's attitude toward the cosmological argument for God changed completely under the influence of his newly devoloped epistemology. The first as well as the second edition of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft give plenty of illustrations for it. But there is no difference or opinion between those two editions regarding the teleological proof of God's existence. The Kritik der reinen Vernunft appeared first in the year 1781 marking a new epoch in the life of Immanuel Kant.

In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kant no longer attempts to conceive the intuitions of space and of time as phenomenal correlates of the Divine omnipresence and eternity; but considers them as absolutely and only subjective forms. He was forced to do this step because in the same work he treated the ideas of relation, the commercium of substance and the idea of substance as merely subjective and consequently could

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no longr find in them an objective basis for the subjective intuitions for space and time. Neither could be find in the eternity of the universal cause the objective basis of the subjective intuition of time. This was especially impossible for him, since he now viewed the absolute as least of all things scientifically knowable.

The teleological argument concludes from the order and adaptation in nature to the absolute wisdom and power of its author. Kant speaks of this argument even in his critical with respect, on account of its efficacy in producing convictions, but he denies its scientific validity.

Dieser Beweis verdient jederzeit mit Achtung genannt zu werden. Er ist der älteste, kläreste, und der gemeinen Menschenvernunft am meisten angemessene. Er belebt das Studium der Natur, so wie er selbst von diesem sein Dasein hat und dadurch immer neue Kraft bekommt. Er bringt Zwecke und Absichten dahin, wo sie unsere Beobachtung nicht von seblst entdeckt hätte, und erweitert unsere Naturkenntnisse durch den Leitfaden einer besonderen Einheit, deren Prinzip ausser der Natur ist. Diese Kenntnisse wirken aber wieder auf ihre Ursache, nämlich die veranlassende Idee, zurück, und vermehren den Gluaben an einen höchsten Urheber bis zu einer unwiderstehlichen Überzeugung.

The conception of finality can, according to Kant, no more than the conception of cause, be employed in justification of conclusions which lead us beyond all the limits of the world of phenomena; for it too is of egoistic or subjective origin, and is, like the conception of cause, transferred by man from himself to things, but it is invalid as applied to transcendental objects. Kant himself states that

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Die Physikotheologie kann uns doch nichts von einem Endzwecke der Schöpfung eröffnen, denn sie reicht nicht einmal bis zur Frage nach demselben. Sie kann also zwar dem Begriff einer verständigen Weltursache als einem subjektiv für die Beschaffenheit unseres Erkenntnisvermögens allein tauglichen Begriff von der Möglickkeit der Dinge, die wir uns nach Zwecken verständlich machen können, rechtfertigen, aber diesen Begriff weder in theoretischer noch praktischer Absicht weiter bestimmen.

In the same paragraph Kant summarizes his position 9 and makes the following statement:

Wir können also wohl sagen . . . nach der Beschaffenheit und den Prinzipien unseres Erkenntnisvermögens, die
Natur in ihren uns bekannt gewordenen zweckmässigen Anordnungen nicht anderes als das Produkt eines Verstandes,
dem diese unterworfen ist denken können: ob aber dieser
Verstand mit dem Ganzen derselben und dessen Hervorbringung noch eine Endabsicht gehabt haben möge (die alsdann
nicht in der Natur der Sinnenwelt liegen würde), das kann
uns die theoretische Naturforschung nie eröffnen.

Did, however, the teleological argument lead to an extramundane author of the world, it would only prove the existence of a world-builder of great power and wisdom, according to the degree of adaptation manifest in the world, but not to an almighty and all-wise creator of the world. And here, again, to supplement the argument by having recourse to the ontological argument would be unjustifiable.

Kant's objections to the teleological argument and a criticism of them. Although Kant had a very high estimate for this argument, he doubted its validity. He raised five objections against it:

The physico-theological argument is one of mere analogy. As such it cannot give apodictic certainty. He has nothing

⁸ Kant, Kr.d. Urt., II, 35.

⁹ Kant, Kr.d. Urt., II, 35.

pts Physikotheologie kant uns doch nichte von einem Endersche der Bunöpfung ereifinen, denn sis reicht nicht nicht offens der Brege nech denselben. Sie kann elso swar dem Segriff einer verständigen Welturssche als einem subjektif die Bescheilenheit unseres Arkennenister undgens silein tanglichen Begriff von der Möglichteil der Dinge, die ein uns nach gwecken verständigt machen können rechtiertigen, aber diesen Begriff weder ig theoretischer noch prektigen, aber diesen bestimmen.

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s Kent, In.d. Urt., II, 200.

dut, Mr.d. Urb., II, bb.

to object to the rationality and utility of this argument. In fact he commends it. But he rejects the claims of apodictic certainty which this argument advances. Kant holds to the view that it cannot hurt the good cause, if the dogmatic language of the overweeming sophist be toned down to a more moderate and humble requirements of a belief adequate to quieten our doubts, though not command unconditional submission. He li himself says:

Ohne hier mit der natürlichen Vernunft über ihren Schluss zu schikanieren, da sie aus der Analogie einiger Naturprodukte mit demjenigen, was menschli che Kunst hervorbringt, wenn sie der Natur Gewalt tut und sie nötigt, micht nach ihren Zwecken zu verfahren, sondern sich in die unsrigen zu schmiegen, (der Ahnlichkeit derselben mit Häussern, Schiffen, Uhren), schliesst, es werde eben eine solche Kausalität, nämlich Verstand und Wille, bei ihr zum Grunde liegen, wenn sie die innere Möglichkeit der freiwirkenden Natur, (die alle Kunst und vielleicht selbst sogar die Vernunft zuerst möglich macht), noch von einer anderen, obgleich übermenschlichen Kunst ableitet welche Schlussart vielleicht die schärfste transzendentale Kritik nicht aushalten dürfte, muss man doch gestehen. dass, wenn wir einmal eine Ursache nennen sollen, wir hier nicht sicherer als nach der Analogie mit dergleichen zweckmässigen Erzeugungen, die die einzigen sind, wovon uns die Ursachen und Wirkungen völlig bekannt sind, verfahren können. Die Vernunft würde es bei sich selbst nicht verantworten können, wenn sie von der Kausalität, die sie kennt, zu dunkeln und unerweislichen Erklärungs-gründen, die sie nicht kennt, übergehen wollte.

Against this objection to Kant the following answer can be given. It is of course possible to use analogy in connection with the teleological argument. But the human experience telss us without exception that a complicated order, design and aim in the natural order of things, cannot be constructed by anything else than, an intelligence. This

lo Kant, Krv, B, 652.

¹¹ Kant, Krv, B, 655.

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Againsh this onjection to item the following anover our be given. It is of course possible to use analogy in commention with the teleployical argument. But the names experience teles us without exception that a compileated order, design and aim in the natural order of things, connot se constructed by engining also them, an intelligence. This

¹⁰ Manty May By one.

is the universal experience of all men and admits of no exceptions. It is of course thinkable that by an incidental, blind, and none-intelligent activity a simple formation can be created. But the more complicated the order becomes, and the more different factors have to be interwoven with some material thing in order to complete its structure, the more improbable does it become for a blind and none-intelligent cause to be the ultimate ground of all existence. If one considers the harmony, order and design of the universe the possibility for a blind chance is very weak. Kant who always urged us to remain on the ground of experience should have had a better understanding for the analogies of the teleological proof for all of them are based upon the facts of experience.

On the other hand it is also possible to have a teleclogical proof for the existence of God without the help of
analogies. The pure speculative reason tells us that order,
design, and purpose are the ingenerated products of an
intelligence. If the activity of free intelligence has any
peculiar qualities of its own over against the motion of
matter, it is the unequalled capacity to produce the most
complicated and yet harmonious order with has a unitary aim,
design, and goal. Wherever a complicated order shows a
unitary purpose, design, and aim, it is a manifestation of
a free intelligence at work.

The teleological argument can only lead to an architect of the world but not to an infinite God. Kant expresses this

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Include proof of the exterence of God student the below of logical proof of the exterence of God student the below of an extent proof of the parts exposulative resume tells us that order, and purpose are the impensated products of an intelligence. If the extivity of the intelligence has any negative musiculate of the two pres equince the most of anterest, it is the unequalited capacity so produce the most capacity to produce the most capacity, and year and year students also added the capacity purpose, design, and conflicted order shows a interest and capacity purpose, design, and cin, it is a manifestation of a free investigation at work.

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thought in the following quotation:

Nach diesem Schlusse musste die Zweckmussigkeit und Wohlgereimheit so vieler Naturanstalten bloss die Zufälligkeit der Form, aber nicht die Materie d.i. dee Substanz in der Welt beweisen; denn zu dem letzteren würde noch erfordert werden, dass bewiesen werden konnte, die Dinge der Welt waren an sich selbst zu dergleichen Ordnung und Einstimmung nach allgemeinen Gestzen untauglich, wenn sie night, selbst ihrer Substanz nach, das Produkt einer hochsten Weisheit waren: wozu aber ganz andere Beweisgrunde als die von der Analogie mit menschlicher Kunst erfordert werden würden. Der Beweis könnte also höchstens einen Weltbaumeister, der durch die Tauglichkeit des Stoffes, den er bearbeitet, immer sehr eingeschränkt wäre, aber nicht einen Weltschöpfer, dessen Idee alles unterworfen ist, dartun, welches zu der grossen Absicht, die man vor Augen hat, memlich ein allgenugsames Urwesen zu beweisen, bei weitem nicht hinreichend ist. Wollten wir die Zufälligkeit der Materie selbst beweisen, so müssten wir zu einem transcendentalen Argumente unsere Zuflucht nehmen, welches aber hier eben hat vermieden werden sollen.

Kant's objection is quite justified if made against the ordinary form of the teleological argument. The common form of this proof is limited to the notion that the final causes of all things imply the existence of God as their author. But once could very easily elaborate this argument. Thus for example natural science tells us that the order, design, and aim in innate in natural things. They do not merely adhere to them, but they grew together with matter and became united with it through growth. All matter is penetrated by design and without a purpose there exist no material things. From this fact we can infer that the intelligent being which is the ulitmate cause of the harmony and the order in the world is the creator of the whole of the substance of all things. He

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and whincut a purpose there exist no material things. From this
fact a can infer that the intelligent being wolch is the
ulitante cause of the harmony and the order in the world is

is not only architect, but also creator of the world. For the one who created matter and sustains it created it with purpose which is intrinsic in matter.

Even a wise architect is not necessarily an infinite being. Kant formulates this objection as follows:

Der Schlussg ehet also von der in der Welt so durchgangig zu beobachtenden Ordnung und Zweckmässigkeit als einer durchaus zufälligen Einrichtung auf das Dasein einer ihr proportionierten Ursache. Der Begriff dieser Ursache aber muss uns etwas ganz Bestimmtes von ihr zu erkennen geben, und er kann also kein anderer sein als der von einem Wesen, das alle Macht, Weisheit, etc., mit einem Worte alle Vollkommenheit als ein allgenugsames Wesen besitzt. Denn die Pradikate von sehr grosser, von erstaunlicher, von unermesslicher Macht und Trefflichkeit geben gar keinen bestimmten Begriff und sagen eigentlich nicht, was das Ding an sich selbst sei, sondern sind nur Verhältnisverstellungen von der Grösse des Gegenstandes, den der Beobachter (der Welt) mit sich selbst und seiner Fassungskraft vergleicht, und sie gleich hochpreisend ausfallen, man mag den Gegenstand vergrössern oder das das beobachtende Subjekt in Verhältnis auf ihn kleiner machen. Wo es an Grosse (der Vollkommenheit) eines Dinges überhaupt ankommt, da gibt es keinen bestimmten Begriff als den, so die ganze mogliche Vollkommenheit begreift, und nur das All (omnitudo) der Realität ist im Begriffe durchgangig bstimmt.

Kant had the notion that God must necessarily be an infinite and omnipotent being in order to God at all. He shared this belief with that of his time, which did not know anything at all about a Finite God.

The idea of a finite God has been developed in its most original and profoundest form by Dr. Brightman. It introduces a dualistic principle into the framework of a monistic philosophy. Dr. Brightman holds to a limitation inherent in

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original and profoundest form by in. Brightmen. It instruduces of desiler to principle into the framework of a monieric of desiler to principle into the framework of a monieric of the framework of a monieric of the framework of a monieric of the framework.

the Divine Nature. Against the Given or Retarding element the Divine will is struggling. The idea of struggle within God's nature is a new idea in the history of personalistic and idealistic philosophy. But God is not only limited by His own nature, He is also limited by the laws of reason. God could not be irrational and unreasonable and still be God. As a rational being God has the capacity to think, but if a person thinks he is in some sense limited by that thought, for his thinking must remain within the sphere of a system. A system is a limitation of man's arbitrariness and demands 14 obedience to its rules. The laws of logic which God has to obey in order to be consistent limit his own rationality.

Kant is therefore quite right when he asserts that a wise architect of the universe is not necessarily an infinite being with infinite wisdom. Every being has to be conditioned in order to fit into the whole system of nature. Beings must obey the laws of nature as well as the laws of logic. The time in which Kant lived was not familiar with the notion of a finite God, - - the Lutheran and Catholic Church knew only of an Almighty Father. But Kant is quite right that the teleological argument can only lead to a finite being with finite wisdom. The will of God confronts factors within the divine consciousness which are dysteleological, eternal, neither created nor approved by the Divine will. Natural evil contains

the Divine Wall is abrockline. The loss of determine element the Divine will is abrockline. The loss of scrupts first of the Doo's nothing is a sew loss in the blacoty of personalisate and idealdable pillusophy. But ded it not only limited by the laws of reason. God over not not one investigated by the laws of reason. God over a switched being and unreasonable and attil or Oct. As a switched being the test of the laws in the brought, for the training the is in sums and a timited by that brought, for the crimens has in a sums a send of the the appears of a system. A system is a limited of man's arothratiness and demands a system is a limited of the laws of their broad reason demands.

wise orditate of the universe is not modes willy an infinite heigh each infinite rision. Green heigh has no or conditioned in order to fit into the whole system of nature. Roinm much oney the laws of nature as vail as the laws of logic. The time in which kent lived was not femiliar with the notion of a limite ded, - - the lutherian and destrolic fauron shew only of the law time that the test one testedock of expense, the will of ded confronts fautous which the nitrite order with the first one testedock of states as titles the nitrite order. The will of ded confronts fautous which the nitrite orders which are destedocked as detrest orders and the nitrite orders and not approved by she lattice will, and shich ascessarily enter three every are of the nivite will, and shich ascessarily enter three every are of the nivite will, and shich ascessarily enters into every are of the nivite will, and shich ascessarily enters into every are of the nivite will, and shich sateral evit Contains

elements which are valueless and without any purpose. But these elements are under the control of God's good will. God is limited by factors capable of rational and moral control. This is the basis for our hope in an eternal progress of the universe and all that belongs to it.

As in an evolutionary process ever new and higher standards of living are developed so also God's perfection is a growing one. His power and control are increasing and His work is expanding. The thought of God as a union of form and local to the content makes it necessary for us to face the question:

Was there a time when there was nothing but pure matter or content, that is, when all was Given? Has God developed from a formless beginning toward a condition which eventually be pure form?

If this question were to be affirmed, then God would be a mere temporal and transient phase of an eternal universe.

He could not be the ultimate source of all beings. But these questions may be answered negatively; for if we suppose that logod is eternally both matter and form,

then from eternity to eternity the divine reason is unchangingly rational, yet also from eternity to eternity the divine has the Given as a stimulus to activity and as a source of problems to solve.

There is then no decisive argument which could lead us the belief that the Given involves either a beginning or an ending of the divine activity.

lo Brightman, PG, 190.

¹⁰ Brightman, PG, 190.

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lo serichmen, 10, 180.

The close connection between the teleological, the cosmological and the ontological argument. The teleological argument if thought through in all details leads to the cosmological and ontological argument. But both of which are invalid because they are a proof of mere words derived from some human subjective concepts. The teleclogical argument can indeed lead us to the point of admiring the greatness, wisdom, and power of the author of the world. But here it stops and can take us no further. We then have to abondon the argument from the empirical basis, and fall back upon the contingency which we infer from the order and purposiveness of the world. With this contingency as the sole premiss the teleological argument advances by the aid of transcendental concepts only to the existence of an absolutely necessary being. It ventures then to make a final step. It jumps from the concept of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determinate or determinable concept of that necessary being which is the all-embracing reality. Thus the teleological argument failing in its own undertaking has in face of this difficulty suddenly fallen back upon the cosmological proof. But the latter is according to Kant nothing else but a disguised ontological proof. It has really achieved its purpose by pure reason alone; although at the outset it denied all kinship with pure reason and professed to establish its conclusions on convincing evidence derived from experience alone.

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If one would scrutinise the procedure of the teleological argument one would find that after advancing some considerable way on the solid ground of experience and nature, one finds onself just as far distant as ever from the object which discloses itself to one's reason. Since experience alone does not help to come to the ultimate ground of all beings one has to leave it and to pass over into the realm of mere possibilities. Here the investigator has to hope upon the wings of ideas to draw near to the object - - the object that had refused itself to all of one's empirical inquiries. After this tremendous leap, when for the teleological argument firm ground seems to have been found, one has to extend one's concept over the whole sphere of creation. Though the teleological argument does not give any information of how one comes to the possession of the determinate concept it is applied to the whole universe. The ideal which this reasoning thus involves is entirely a product of pure reason and has been confused throughout the whole argument as originating from experience. Kant himself summarizes it as follows:

So liegt demnach dem physikotheologischen Beweise der kosmologische, diesem aber der ontologische Beweis vom Dasein eines einigen Urwesens ald höchsten Wesens zu Grunde, und da ausser diesen dreien Wegen keiner mehr der spekulativen Vernunft offen ist, so ist der ontologische Beweis aus lauter reinen Vernunftbegriffen der einzig mögliche, wenn überall nur ein Beweis von einem so weit über allen empirischen Verstandesgebrauch erhabenen Satze möglich ist.

The following criticism has to be passed on Kant's objection to the teleological argument in this form. He is

¹⁸ Kant, Krv, B, 657. 19 Kant, Krv, B, 658.

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So lingt demnach dem physikotheologischen Beweise der kosmologische, diesem aber der ontologische Reweis vom Desein eines sinigen Urwesens als höchsten Wesens an Grunde, und da eusser diesen dreien Wegen keiner mehr der application vermunft offen let, so ist der ontologische Beweis aus lanter reinen Vermunftoegriffen der einsig mögliche, wann übergal nur ein Beweis von einem so weit über allen empirischen Verstendesgebrauen ernabenen Satze möglich ist.

The following criticism has to be passed on Mant's conjection to the teleclogical argument in this form. He is

¹⁰ Ant, Mry, B, COV.

right in asserting that the ontological argument is a proof 21 of mere concepts. Prof. Dr. Bowne says,

The ontological argument in its most common form rests on the notion of the perfect being. The idea of the perfect necessarily includes the idea of existence, and would be a contradiction without it. Hence it has been concluded that the perfect exists. There is not a shadow of cogency in this reasoning. It only points out that the idea of the perfect must include the idea of existence; but there is nothing to show that the self-consistent idea represents an objective reality.

The idea of a perfect being is thought of as implying the existence of that being. But it does not take into account the fact that a mere idea cannot prove its reality. No single idea carries its own proof with it. There is a fundamental difference between the mere idea of a reality and the reality itself. Idea as such does not involve existence. Kant is therefore quite right in rejecting this traditional form of the ontological argument.

But he is not right in asserting that the teleological argument is based on the cosmological. Both proofs are based upon entirely different facts. The cosmological argument deals with the fact of the new rise and the passing away of parts of the whole world systems, while the teleological argument deals with the facts of the design and the purposiveness prevailing in nature. Both proofs come to entirely different results. The cosmological argument leads to the belief in the existence of an external being, of an ens a se about whose character we know nothing save that he is the ultimate world ground. The teleological argument results in the belief of a

²¹ Bowne, T, 47. 22 Lotze, M, II, 670.

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creative, external being full of wisdom and design and purposive ness. The cosmological argument exalts the fullness of God's existence as an ens a se; while the teleological argument emphasizes the free and creative activity of the wise world architect and finally points to God as the Creator. This difference is not merely verbal, but it is rooted deep in the reality of our human experience.

The teleological argument rests upon mere subjective categories of thought. Kant finally holds that the teleological argument is nothing more than a mere hypothesis built upon purely subjective concepts and ideas; for it rests upon subjective categories of thought. These are, purpose, unity, and the idea of a world and of a God.

The teleological argument holds that the highest formal unity is the purposive unity of things. It comes to this conclusion by the aid of the speculative reason; though it does not want to acknowledge it. It regards all the order in the world as if it had originated in the purposiveness of a supreme reason. Such a principle applied to the field of experience opens up entirely new views as to how the things of the world may be connected according to teleological laws. Thus it enables us to construct a new unity of the world in accordance with our own teleological interests. Kant says:

Die Voraussetzung einer obersten Intelligenz, als der alleinigen Ursache des Weltganzen, aber freilich bloss in der Idee, kann also jederzeit der Vernunft nutzen und dabei doch niemals schaden. oregules, external celta to a vision and resign and parported as an account as the fullness of Galla as a large of a day and a solution and an account and a solution and a large and and area to god as an area to a life also active and a large paints to god as an area area allowed as a large and a large paints to god as an area area and a large and a la

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The teleclopical argument holds that the initial formal during it the purpositive unity of things. The coase to inits conclination by the sin of the speculative reason; through it does not want to approvious it. It reports all the order in the world as if it had originaled in the purpositioness of a supreme research a principle smilled to the filed of chaestence opens as not reasons as to how the things of the world may we connected encording to beauty of the world in specials it encoles us to construct a new multy of the world in accordance with our countries a new multy of the world in accordance with our

 The assumption of the existence of God does not harm reason because it gives a systematic unity to the world, but it is nothing else but a mere hypothesis which can be used as long as it does not create contradictions.

Denn wenn wir in Ansehung der Figur der Erde (der runden, doch etwas abgeplatteten), der Gebirge und Meere etc. lauter weise Absichten eines Urhebers zum voraus annehmen, so können auf diesem Wege eine Menge von Endekkungen machen. Bleiben wir nun bei dieser Moraussetzung als einem bloss regulativen Prinzip, so kann selbst der Irrtum uns nichts schaden. Denn es ebenfalls daraus nichts weiteres folgen, als dass, wo wir einen teleologischen Zusammenhang (nexus effectivus) angetroffen werde, wodurch wir in einem solchen Falle nur eine Einheit mehr vermissen, aber nicht die Vernunfteinheit in ihrem empirischen Gebrauche verderben.

The error of our assumption cannot do us an serious harm.

The worst that can happen is that we are disappointed in our expected teleological connection and we find mere mechanical or physical laws at work. Even a disappointment of this kind 25 cannot effect the teleological law in its general bearing.

Denn obzwar ein Zergliederer des Irrtums überführt werden kann, wenn er irgend ein Gliedmass eines tierischen Körpers auf einen Zweck bezieht, von welchem man deutlich zeigen kann, dass er daraus nicht erfolge, so ist es doch gänzlich unmöglich, in einem Falle zu beweisen, dass eine Natureinrichtung, es mag sein welche es wolle, ganz und gar keinen Zweck habe.

The assumption that there is a unitary being which gave unity and purpose is a regulative principle of reason. It aids us in securing the highest possible systematic unity by means of the idea of the purposeve causality of the supreme cause of the world. We regard it "as if" this being acts

25 Kant, Krv, B, 710.

²⁴ Kant, KrV, B, 715-10.

reason because it gives a systematic unity to the world, out reason because it gives a systematic unity to the world, out it is nothing also but a more hypothesis shion on the used as long as it is does not create contradictions.

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in accordance with a wise purpose and "as if" it were the cause of all things.

Against this statement of Kant the following criticisms can be made. Kant's arguments are the outcome of his epistemology, in which the concepts of order, purpose, purposiveness, and aim are mere subjective categories of thought. The idea of world and of God are subjective ideas of reason. Everything which transcends the phenomenal real is only "as if" it were real.

In the chapter on Kant's epistemology I showed that Kant's view stands in contrast to the perceptions and judgments of the human consciousness and that they lead either to a solipsism or to an epistemological skepticism. But that would mean the denial of all knowledge and the self-surrendering of reason. But every normal human being holds that it can understand truth. The teleological argument leads us thus back to the main problem of epistemology: Is science and with it truth possible to be understood by the human mind or not? If the answer has to be negative, then no argument for God is possible at all. They are nothing more but a mere play of words. Whosoever follows Kant in his epistemology must finally also deny the possibility of natural science and of truth etc. For according to Kant unity, order, purposiveness and aim in nature - - the very basical facts to which natural science holds, - - all of them are rendered by the Kantian epistemology only "as if" they were real.

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CHAPTER VII

KANT'S MORAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD

The theoretical proofs of the existence of God are the so-called ontological, cosmological, and teleological or physico-theological arguments. Kant denied all of thee theoretical arguments ultimate validity. The idea of God like all the other transcendental conceptions of reason, has theoretical vality only in so far as it, as a regulative principle, serves to lead the understanding in all empirical cognition to seek for systematic unity. All transcendental ideas are not constitutive principles through which certain objects lying beyond the reach of experience may be known. They merely help to form a systematic unity and completeness in all the comprehensions of our understanding made in the field of experience. We are required by a correct maxim of natural philosophy to abstain from all theological and from all transcendent expalanation of the arrangement of nature generally. But in the employment of the practical reason the ideal of the reason of God may serve as a form of though for the highest object of moral and religious faith. God is a postulate of the pure practical reason. Under a postulate Kant understands

einen theoretischen, als solchen aber nicht erweisbaren Satz . . , sofern er einem a priori unbedingt geltenden praktischen Gesetz unzertrennlich anhängt.

Kant tries to prove this assertion in a long argumentation. He shows first that the immortality of the human soul

¹ Kant, KrV, B, 153.

CHAPTER VII

MANTE MORAL LANGUEST FOR GOD

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is a postulate of the pure practical reason, and he concludes then that also the existence of God and all the qualities attributed to Him are postulates of the pure practical reason. It is my intention to follow Kant's own argumentation, though critically, in order to get a clear understanding of the exact position he takes. Later on I shall pass some criticism on his argumentation, and finally I shall attempt to reconstruct all what is helpful and good in his argumentations formulating new arguments out of them.

The postulate of immortality of the human soul.

Kant's treatment of the postulate of immortality. The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the object of the moral will or of the pure practical reason. Under the term the summum bonum Kant understands the union of virtue and happiness. It is to be thought of as the object of the individual desire; for morality is not a doctrine of human happiness. It is not the demand for happiness but the moral law that moves the will to strive toward the highest good. All actions which really shall have some moral value must have their origin in the moral law quite apart from any consideration of results. The moral law presupposes a moral order and the possibility for its realization. If the moral order were for ever unattainable pure morality would be impossible at all. The realization of the union of virtue and happiness in a moral order is the object or final goal of all moral

the a possulate of the pure proposed reason, and he concludes then that also the existence of God and all the suchishes than that also the possulation of the pure procedural reason. It is my intention to follow hand's own argument time, though oritically, in order to get a class understanding of the exact possition in takes. Later on I shall pass some critical an on his argumentation, and finally I shall absence to reconstruct all short is noiping and finally I shall absence to reconstruct now that is noiping and good in the drymantestime formulating new arguments out of them.

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Menils tree and the course to the pure precise of immortality. The realization of the guarant bounds in the world it are not to the pure precised reason. Under the sent the angular of the precise and the primer. It is to be thought of as the origin of the and individual desire; for mortality is not a describe of numen individual desire; for mortality is not a describe of numen appares. It is not the describe to not the mortal has their moves the thirt of this individual describe and in a self-individual and the solution and in the solution and in the mortal have acree mortal value must have the mortal that apart from any considered the possibility for the realization. If the mortal order and the pure mortality sould be impossible as all. The residential of the union of virtue and harminess in nortal nortal as all. The residential of the union of virtue and harminess in anotal order in a mortal order in a mortal order of a large of all nortal

actions.

But there is a conflict between the demand for the summum bonum as the necessary object of the pure practical reason or moral will and the fact that even by the most punctilious observance of the moral law in the world we cannot expect any necessary connection of happiness with virtue, adequate to the summum bonum. Kant solves this problem by reference to man as noumenon. Man is both a phenomenal and a noumenal reality. The human being exists as a noumenon in the world of the understanding. It is only in this intelligible world that the ultimate connection between virtue and happiness can be attained. The possibility of the realization of the summum bonum depends upon the immortality of the moral personality. If man were not immortal he could never reach the state of holiness or the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law. No rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence to have his mind and action in perfect harmony with the moral law. Nevertheless since it is required as practical necessary it can only be found in a progress in infinitum toward that perfect accordance. It is therefore practical necessary to assume the reality of such a progress in infinitum and to postulate the immortality of the human soul as its fundamental condition. The endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence of the personality of the individual

² Kant, KpV, 202.

Kant, KpV, 202.

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soud civ modes any coursellan of heppiness till vistores, adequate to the summan name solves this procles of reference to man as nouncinon. Man la socia a pinamoment en a nogramment reality. The landers walled as a nogrammen in the morte of the university in is only in this intellihap these out to wallful The possibility of the realization personality. If nur yere not inmortal be could never reach biro. eleienes end le galen lanchest of wel faron end adir sacled travel . wel lerom add tidly goomred increase at molecus cardine one . Additioned fatherebnot est to from a une ed lo

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Kent, MpV, sas.

being which we call the immortality of the soul. Kant establishes thus the objective validity of the belief in immortality of the human soul on the basis of man's hope and his necessity to realize the highest good. Since the sensible world cannot offer complete blissfulness as reward of virtue man has to wait for it and to hope for a future world. Only in the endlessness of his duration which God alone can survey can man become holy and bring his will wholly in accordance with the moral law.

A criticism of Kant's treatment of the postulate of immortality. Kant's argumentation is not satisfactory for the following reasons:

the time when the union of virtue and happiness as the highest goal of men can be attained. Kant seems to move it way back into an infinite and never fully attainable distance. Even in the noumenal realm the human soul still has to struggle in order to come into fuller possession of the summum bonum. The human will never comes to rest; for it is impossible to become absolutely perfect and that to end its own perfection. But modern psychology shows that it is necessary for us to know that it is possible to be morally good and to obtain the union of virtue and happiness without which man cannot be satisfied. Kant's argumentation takes away some of the beneficial incentives to strive toward the achievement of the good;

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it cannot be attained fully inspite of all our human efforts as phenomenal as well as noumenal beings. T_he summum bonum can never be attained wholly and thus man can never be fully satisfied.

morality a metaphysical basis. The moral subject is totally different from his sensuous appearance in the world of experience. As such he stands above space and time and cannot be thought of by means of the categories. Kant always emphasized that space and time are only to be used in connection with the world of appearances as a necessary form of intuition. But his theory of the progress in infinitum presupposes the conception of space and of time and is thus subjected to the conditions of them. But this contradicts Kant's position in the transcendental aesthetic, where he emphasized that the rational will cannot be thought of a progressive, itself developing, or changing. Perhaps I should do best to give Kant's own words:

Dieses handelnde Subjekt würde nun nach seinem intelligibelen Charakter unter keinen Zeitbedingungen stehen,
denn die Zeit ist nur die Bedingung der Erscheinung, nicht
aber der Dinge an sich selbst. In ihm würde keine Handlung
entstehen oder vergehen, mihin würde es auch nicht dem
Gesetze aller Zeitbestimmungen, alles Veränderlichen
unterworfen sein: dass alles, was geschieht, in den Erscheinungen (des vorigen Zustandes) seine Ursache
antreffe.

5) Furthermore the soul must be in the noumenal realm in a steady anxiety and sorrow; for it might be that it would change its mind and thus lose the summum bonum for ever.

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piness handelnus Subjekt which and nach selhem intelligation Charekter unter island islandinguages ereben, donn die Zeit ist ner die Bedingung der inscreinung, mient ober der Dinge en sich selbet. In lie wirde keine Nindlung anterehon eder vergenen, mihin wärde es auch nicht dem anterworfen sein: des einstenngun, siles Verfinderiliehen anterworfen sein; des vorigen Austendes) seine Ursache antereite.

b) Purthermore the soul must be in the nonneal to the season in a steady analety and sorrow; for it wint be that it is the summum bonum for ever.

It is possible that the soul changes her character in the normal world for she is not absolutely good anyhow and needs improvements. Thus the normal world becomes a place of anxiety and agony of fear. It really is not a place of happiness at all but one full of sorrows.

- 4) Not only the desire for happiness but also the human longing for a life of the highest moral standing cannot be satisfied in the noumenal world. Man is always striving and never reaches perfection. His morality must necessarily be incomplete -- it must be improvable. But the human soul really does not strive toward such a patchwork and could not be satisfied with it. At least in the noumenal real we should be able to accept completeness and be happy with it.
- tal idealism an impossible idea. Just as impossible as it is to put together and to unite synthetically appearance and the Ding-an-sich, the empirical man on the one side and the moral man on the other side, because appearance and non-appearance are contradictions, so it is impossible to bring into unity the sensuous desires of the empirical man and the character of the summum bonum.
- 6) Finally it has to be pointed out that Kant's argumentation for the postulate of the immortality of the human soul stands in a clear contrast to the epistemological principles as laid down in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft.

It is possible and the soul changes her cassacter in the mountens sould for she the not account to make the sould second a place of shrifty and egony of feer. It resliy is not a place of negitiess at all out one that of sorrows.

- to an longing tor a life of the happiness and attending cannot be astisfied in the nounce of the world. Men is always standing cannot be astisfied in the nounced world. Men is always staiving and never received perfection. His mornist, and never received to improve the said and and and and could not sent it must be improved and a patchmork and could not be antisted with it. At has being the nounced to should so is and the said of the
- of the highest good is on the ground of transcendental light to intensible as it is to put together and to unite synthetically appearance and the Ulm -an-item, the empirical man on the one side can appearance and nonel man on the other side, because appearance and non-anparance are contradictions, so it is impossible to bring into the samenous desires of the empirical man and the obsessors of the surmum bonum.
 - enmentation for the postulate of the lamortality of the inner entered to the inner entered to the lamortality of the inner entered to the characterist polar soul stands in a clear contrast to the epistemological principles as laid nown in the Erithic der reinen Vernünit.

Immortality is only a postulate of the practical reason. It holds to be true because of its practical significance for the whole of life, but there is no rational proof for its truth in the whole argumentation. The postulate of the immortality is based entirely upon our volitional and not upon our speculative nature. The human mind which wanted to obtain a rational insight into the whole problem is disappointed; for Kant claims there is no rational proof for the postulate of immortality besides the one of our volitional nature. On that basis it has to be postulated on account of its practical significance for the whole of life.

The existence of God as the postulate of the pure practical reason. The existence of God is postulated by Kant as the necessary condition for the existence of the summum bonum in the intelligible world. The summum bonum is possible only on the supposition of God as the highest cause of nature, He must have a causality which corresponds to the moral character. He must be an intelligent being for every one who is capable of acting in accordance with the idea of law and order must be an intelligent being. The causality of such a being is his will. Consequently, God, as the supreme cause of nature, inasmuch as he must be presupposed as a condition of the summum bonum is a being that, through his own intelligence and will, is the ultimate cause of the world, and as

Immortality is only a possulate of the prescion respond to the colds to be true because of the precised significance for the whole of life, but there is no retional proof for the truth is the whole argumentation. The postulate of the immortality of and not upon our spoonal lative nature. The names wind enten wanted to cottain a reliculative nature, the immas wind enten wanted to cottain a reliculational instant into the whole problem is disappointed; for hand claims there is no retional proof for the postulate of immortality besides the one of our volitional nature. Unitatively algority to the postulate of its precised and scoons of its precised attention.

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such its author. From the reality of the highest original good, i.e. the existence of God the highest derived good or the pest possible world is derived.

Also ist die oberste Ursache der Natur, sofern sie zum höchsten Gute vorausgesetzt werden muss, ein Wesen, das durch Verstand und Willen die Ursache (folglich der Urheber) der Natur ist, d.i. Gott. Folglich ist das Postulat der Möglichkeit des höchsten abgeleiteten Guts (der besten Welt) zugleich das Postulat der Wirklichkeit eines höchsten ursprünglichen Guts, nämlich der Existenz Gottes. Nun war es Pflicht für uns das höchste Gut zu befördern, mithin nicht allein Befugnis, sondern auch mit der Pflicht als Bedürfnis verbundene Notwendigkeit, die Möglichkeit des höchsten Gutes vorauszusetzen, welches, da es nur unter der Bedingung des Daseins Gottes stattfindet, die Voraussetzung desselben mit der Pflicht unzertrennlich verbindet, d.i. es ist moralisch notwendig, das Dasein Gottes anzunehmen.

It is man's duty to promote the <u>summum bonum</u>. It is consequently not merely legitimate but it is of necessity connected with duty as a need that we should assume the possibility of this <u>summum bonum</u>. But since this is possible only under the condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects this assumption with duty. Therefore it is morally necessary and required to assume the existence of God.

The practical reason regards the ultimate union of virtue and happiness as necessary. Man is bound to seek to further this harmony or the highest good. It is the indispensible condition for the realization of the highest good. Hence we must postulate the existence of a causal reality which by its own intelligence and will, will be able to effectuate the exact agreement of happiness with morality. In other words we must postulate the existence of God.

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Liso let die oberete Urgedie der Hatur, solore sie aum höcksten Gute vorausgesetzt werden muss, ein Wasge, dus dus durch Veretend und Willen die Urseche (rolgiton der Urheber) der Maur ist, d.i. gott. Rolgiton des des Posimina der Mathioheete des höcksten abgeleiteten (k.t. 1 der Dessen Welt) sugleich des höcksten der Wirdlichkeit eine Köchsten ursprünglichen Gube, nämlich der Wirdlichkeit ober es Pflicht uns das höunste Gut zu heibrarn, wient sieht slieh Gefügnis, sondern auch mit der Fillant des höchsten Gutes vorsaszusetzen, welches, das de nur unter der Bedinging des Daseins Dottes stattifindet, die Woglichkeit unter der Bedinging des Daseins Dottes stattifindet, die Vorenssetzung des Daseins Dottes stattificht undertrendlich verbandet, das des Fillant verbandet, das ist noralisch notwendig, das Lasein Gottes augunomen.

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The practical reason is of course not able to transcend the empirical conditions and to attain a knowledge of God. No knowledge of God is possible for the theoretical or speculative reason. Kant himself states in his Vorworte to Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, criticizing the demand for theoretical knowledge of God:

Alle Menschen könnten hieran auch genug haben, wenn sie (wie sie sollten) sich bloss an die Vorschrift der reinen Vernunft im Gesetze hielten. Was brauchen sie auch den Ausgang ihres moralischen Tuns und Lassens zu wissen, den der Weltlauf herbeiführen wird? Für sie ist's genug, dass sie ihre Pflicht tun, es mag nun auch mit dem irdischen Leben alles aus sein und wohl gar selbst mit diesem, Glückseligkeit und Würdigkeit vielleicht niemals zusammentreffen. Nun ist's aber eine von den unvermeidlichen Einschränkungen des Menschen und seines (vielleicht auch aller anderen Weltwesen) praktischen Vernunftvermögens, sich bei allen Handlungen nach dem Erfolg aus denselben umzusehen.

Nor must we presume to use the conception of God for the purpose of deducing the moral laws; for it was from the inherent practical necessity of those very laws that we were led to the hypothesis of an independent cause or of a wise ruler of the world. Kant himself states:

Die Moral, sofern sie auf dem Begriffe des Menschen als eines freien, eben darum aber sich selbst durch seine Vernunft an unbedingte Gesetze bindenden wesens gegründet ist, bedarf weder der Idee eines anderen Wesens über ihm, um seine Pflicht zu erkennen, noch einer anderen Triebfeder als des Gesetzes selbst, um sie zu beobachten. Wenigstens ist es seine eigene Schuld, wenn sich ein solches Bedürfnis an ihm vorfindet, dem alsdann auch durch nichts anderes abgeholfen werden kann; weil, was nicht aus ihm selbst und seiner Freiheit entspringt, keinen Ersatz für den Mangel seiner Moralität abgiebt. - - Sie bedarf also zum Behuf ihrer selbst (sowohl objective, was das Wollen, als subjektive, was das Können betrifft) keineswegs der Religion, sondern, vermöge der reinen praktischen Vernunft, ist sich selbst genug.

⁷ Kant, RGV, Vorwort, iii-iv.

⁸ Kant, RGV, Vorwort, iii*iv.

The predictions reason to of course not note to break of the course of the course of the course of specifical conditions and to attain the theoretical of the course of th

alle Monachen Mönnten hierem auch remug heben, wend ate (wie sie sollten) alch oloss an die Vorscuritt dat ste fate et auch eine statie hierem vernunt in Gesetze hielten. Was druuchen ein such retuen vernunt in Gesetze hiere moralischen Muns und bassens zu wissen, den der McTelsuf herbeitübren wirdt für ein sie ist genug, den dat sie ist a genug den hiere Filiant tun, es wag nun anch mit den irdiesen alles nun and wohl est selfet ilt diesen, Gidonsolt und Mirdigheit vielleicht niemale zusensche bereiten, man ist a seer eine von den unverweitlichen des werneben und selben (vernuntbrenden des werneben und selben Vernuntbrenden gens, alen och alle menhaltungen und Sem arfolg was denre nelsen unwesten.

Nor must me presume to use the conception of God for the purpose of demoing the moral laws; for it was area the fraction independent of the hypothesis of an independent cause on of a wise rules of the hypothesis of an independent cause on of a wise rules of the hypothesis of an independent cause on of a wise

Die Morel, sotern eie auf dem Begriffe des Manselen ein eines freien, oben derum aber sidn selbet onen melen verment zu anbeilnigte Gesette vind mien meens ceptänielige, bedarf weder der blee eines ande eines mideren fried das, beder alt des gesetzes selbet, am ale be besoonungen.

Wenigstens ist es soins eigene schuld, sonn sich ein sein durch des eben Bedärfinis en ihm verkladet, dem eledens such durch nichte anderen abgeholten sesden sich dir sein nichte anderen abgeholten sesden siche eine hebbelt enterfligt, was nicht aus the selbet und selber Preibelt enterfligt, welchen bedarf also sen Mansel seiner Morelität theilen. - 21e bedarf also sucjektive, was das Mollen, als sucjektive, was das Mollen vernunt, ist eich selfet genüs.

Aunt, New, Verwort, 111-14.

cf a lawgiver is an essential condition for a moral life they show nothing else but their own lack of inner morality. The moral law is eternally given in the structure of reason and is not created by any arbitrary will.

According to Kant the question: What may I hope leads to the assumption of the absolute reality of the existence of the most high being. Kant comes to this assertion on account of his previous assumption that something is which can determine the last possible purpose, because something has to come to pass. Perhaps it is good to express it with Kant's own words:

Alles Hoffen geht auf Glückseligkeit und ist in Absicht auf das Praktische und das Sittengesetz eben dasselbe, was das Wissen und das Naturgesetz in Ansehung der theoretischen Erkenntnis der Dinge ist. Jenes längt zuletzt auf den Schluss hinaus, das etwas sei (was den letzten möglichen Zweck bestimmt) weil etwas geschehen soll; dieses das etwas sei (was als oberste Ursache wirkt), weil etwas geschieht.

Glückseligkeit ist die Befriedigung aller unserer Neigungen (sowohl extensive, der Mannigfältigkeit derselben,

als intensive, dem Grade, und auch protensive, der Dauer

nach.

Happiness, of course, is not the motive of our actions, but to become worthy of happiness may be and shall be the motive of our actions and will-determinations. Mere happiness would be a material end and would be as such contrary to the concept of morality. It would also be a priori or universally valid and necessary. Consequently the categorical imperative can take 10 the following form:

⁹ Kant, KrV, B, 615 - - ; RGV, 60. 10 Kant, KrV, B, 617.

description is an essential condition for a nor 1 life only show nothing also but unexpect to a second long and the state of inner morality. The most law is abstract the structure of reason and is not created by the conditions of the structure of reason and is

Accomplant to Main the cuestion: What may I hope letter to be an accompanie to be a second to the extense of the country of the country of the instruction that second to the country of t

Happiness, of course, is not the motive of our leader of the derivative of the course of the course

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Tue das, wodurch du wurdig wirst, glückselig zu sein. The transition to the idea of a supreme being Kant made very hesitatingly. The only moral motive, he had maintained. is respect for the moral law itself, and this feeling of reverence is directed to the object on the same ground. One respects always persons and not things. But the respect we show to persons is properly speaking a respect to the moral law which the conduct of the person exhibits. God Himself is holy because in Him the will and the moral law coincide. The moral law owes its validity not to an arbitrary act of the volition on the part of God, but to its own moral contents. The existence of God is not postulated as the basis for moral obligation; for the moral autonomy gives to every person his own free choice without any compulsions. Men are not forced to do the right, - - that would be itself not right and immoral.

Holiness or the union of virtue and happiness is an end in itself. It is the <u>summum bonum</u> which is granted to men by God. This God must be omniscient for he has to examine men's hearts and to determine the presence or the absence of moral standard in them. He has also to find out the kind and the degree of morality present in them in order to be able to reward them justly.

This God must also be omnipotent; for he has toodistribute happiness to men the amount of which exceeds the productivity of all natural beings.

¹¹ Kant, KrV, B, 617 England, KCG, 179.

The transition to the idea of a supreme seing has mean the transition to the idea of a supreme seing has mean very testinatingly. The only moral motive, he had maintained, the respect for the moral law itself, and this feeling of the respect so respects a single process always persons and not things, But the respect we show to persons is properly specifing a respect to the moral law mich the conduct of the person exhibits. God Minself is hely decause in him the will end the moral law conduct of the yellon to an asymptoty of the volition on the part of God, but to an asymptoty obt of the contents. The existence of God is not postulated as the basis for moral conficute. Obligation, for the moral account rives to so the first own marel contents.

The existence of God is not postulated as the basis for moral own free choice without any compulations, when are not forced own free choice without any compulations, when are not forced to the right, —— ther would be itself not right and immoral to the right, —— ther would be itself not right and immoral as a first and interpress the sections of the contents of

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God must also be eternal; for he has to grant an eternal happiness which He could not do unless He enjoyed it
Himself.

This God must finally be full of kindliness and goodness for He has the good will to make men eternally happy.

A criticism of Kant's treatment of the postulate of God. Kant's argumentations contain a lot of right points; and yet his theory seems to have to be denied.

Angeneral criticism of the postulate of God's existence.

The following reasons can be brought forth against

Kant's theory:

1) Kant himself ascribes to his argument only practical value and denies its conclusiveness to the theoretical 12 reason. He himself says:

Zur Pflicht gehört hier nur die Bearbeitung zur Hervorbringung und Beförderung des höchsten Guts in der Welt, dessen Möglichkeit also postuliert werden kann, die aber unsere Vernunft nicht anders denkbar findet, als unter Voraussetzung einer höchsten Intelligenz, deren Dasein anzunehmen also mit dem Bewustein unserer Pflicht verbunden ist, obzwar diese Annehmung selbst für die theoretische Vernunft gehört, in Ansehung deren allein sie, als Erklärungsgrund betrachtet, Hypothese, in Beziehung aber auf die Verständlichkeit eines uns doch durchs moralische Gesetz aufgegebenen Objekts (des höchstens Guts), mithin eines Bedürfnisses in praktischer Absicht, Glaube und zwar reiner Vernunftglaube heissen kann, weil bloss reine Vernunft (sowohl ihrem theoretischen als praktischen Gebrauche nach) die Quelle ist, daraus er entspringt.

But this does not sound like the certainty the human mind seeks in questions concerning such important matters.

Kant's position is based upon doubt and the uncertainty of it

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does not satisfy the human understanding. The theoretical does not know anything at all about Goff. God is unknown and unknowable for the speculative reason. But the practical reason assumes God's existence because the moral nature of men needs Him. Consequently one and the same reason being applied to different fields of experience on the one hand accepts God as known and knowable and on the other hand denies his knowability. This does not seem to be correct. In order to demonstrate the close connection of morality with religion Kant had to give up his earlier position, and to be inconsistent throughout his writings.

of his own epistemology. The whole field of morality is based upon the pure practical reason. But all that the practical reason is able to produce is postulates, i.e. truths which the pure theoretical reason can only feel or anticipate, but not demonstrate or scientifically warrant. They are not to be accepted as rationally proved. Thus the freedomoof the will, the immortality of the human soul, and the existence of God are merely subjective ideas. All of these concepts cannot be rationally proved but have to be accepted as true because of their great practical significance for the whole of life. It seems so very strange that Kant in his last writings has to consider the practical necessities of life when he excluded them all completely in his critical period. At that time the moral law was completely separated from any connection

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with the necessities of practical life and consequently a mere formula.

- according to the Kantian philosophy not quite clear. He demands men to be good for the sake of goodness or for the sake of the moral law expressing the good will of men. The good ought to be done for its own sake, just because it is the good and ought to be obeyed as such. Christianity agrees with Kant, but finds in the self-denying or self-less love of God as the highest good a much better formulation. Also Christianity rejects mere selfish actions as morally wrong, - it is only in connection with God as the highest good that we strive toward moral ideals and act in harmony with the moral law. Thus men are not good for the sake of morality alone; but because they want to cooperate with God in the increase and conservation of values. Men obey God because they find in Him the highest possible good.
- 4) Furthermore God really does not have any reason for rewarding men with the summum bonum in the noumenal world, for men did not obey any divine commandments but followed merely the categorical imperative, which is based upon man's own moral nature. Kant founded morality upon the a priori principles of the practical reason.

Also drückt das moralische Gesetz nichts anderes aus als die Autonomie der reinen praktischen Vernunft, d.i. der Freiheit. . . .

In der Unabhängigkeit . . . von aller Materie des Gesetzes (nämlich einem begehrten Objekte) und zugleich doch Bestimmung der Willkur durch die blosse allgemeine

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gesetzgebende Form, deren eine Maxime fähig sein muss, besteht das allgemeine Prinzip der Sittlichkeit.

Autonomy is the "Eigenschaft des Willens, sich selbt 14
ein Gesetz zu sein." The obedience of the moral law is done
for the sake of morality alone without any consideration of
God. Kant himself holds to the position that to consider
anything but the moral law would be heteronomous and would
thus deny the autonomy of the categorical imperative. And
yet, though men do not care for God, He is expected to reward
them for their own doings. God shall give to them happiness
although He was never taken into consideration by them. Kant's
philosophy implies the thought that God shall reward all humanists etc., who rationally denied His own existence, but
followed the moral law. This does not seem to be sound.

- God is not even necessary for the human happiness. Man does not need God for the exercise of morality. He is neither the lawgiver not is He the motive of man's moral action. Men act virtually by their own vigor and strength. The summum bonum is the union of virtue and happiness and it is inseparably connected with the transcendental realm. Consequently the attainment of the summum bonum depends upon men themselves and not upon God. Men gain it themselves autonomously.
- 6) Furthermore it has to be said that the role ascribed to God by Kant is very unworthy of Him. He is pictured as the

¹⁴ Kant, GMS, II, 58.

¹⁵ Kant, GMS, II, 74.

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law, virtue, and the holiness of character, which he is supposed to reward. Kant reduces God to a mere bringer of pleasure without manifesting Himself as the Holy One. On the other hand if God has no connection with the moral law why should He reward men with happiness and should be interested in men's virtue? The virtue is according to Kant conditioned by men's own work and labour and is the result of it, - then why should He be interested in it? This points to another of the main objections to the Kantian moral philosophy:

Kant's categorical imperative has to be rejected because of its autonomous character. Kant holds it to be universally true and valid. But from whom does the categorical imperative get these characteristics? - - Obviously not from men. There is only one person adequate to give those characteristic qualities and that is God Himself. Therfore God Himself can be the only originator of the moral law. Kant is right in so far as the human reason is the revealer of this law, but he is wrong in asserting that it originated in men's own thoughts without any divine help. The human concience is the immediate guardian of the moral law, but even it is conditioned by God from whom it got its standards of judging and testing. The human reason alone is not the last ground and norm of the moral law, - - otherwise the moral law were too subjective and could not be soreign but were subjected to errors and mistakes of human thinking. Only God

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is able to render the moral law free from mistakes and to make it absolutely necessary for the whole life and universally valid.

A criticism of the postulates of the Divine attributes. Also Kant's postulates of the Divine attributes are not satisfactory. Kant objected to the teleological argument that this proof would lead merely to a wise architect of the world, but not to an infinite God. The order and the purposiveness in nature is limited and cannot lead to an infinite cause of them. But in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Kant changes his former standpoint and adopts his old notion of an omnipotent and infinite God as needed for the practical life.

But this argumentation is not quite consistent. For also the happiness that God is supposed to grant to men is limited and conditioned. It is consequently not necessary at all for God to be infinite in order to give men happiness.

A finite happiness can be produced by a finite being and an infinite being could not even be expected to do something unfinished and incompletely in its form. A being of finite power amd wisdom could reward finitely. Consequently the postulates of the Divine infinitude, omnipotence, etc. are out of harmony with Kant's own system.

is able to remose the moral low free from electrics and to make it absolutely necessary for the whole life and universally valid.

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CHAPTER VIII

A RECONSTRUCTION OF KANT'S EVALUATIONAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD

I shall try to combine all that seems to me valuable in Kant's moral argument in order to reconstruct the whole argument in a more adequate form.

Deep in the human nature there are tow fundamental human desires: the desire for happiness and the desire of morality. Both are inseparably connected in human life.

Everybody working hard to become a better man should be rewarded for it both here on earth as well as in the transcendental realm of existence. This means he ought to obtain happiness. It is God's duty to grant to every moral man this happiness. Thus the natural desire for morality and happiness in men point toward the transcendental reality or to the existence of God, Both tendencies of our nature can be used as the basis for two separated though very related arguments for the existence of God. We could name them the deentological and the eudaemological argument.

The deontological argument for God.

Our human soul is immediately conscious of certain moral obligations in us. These are of fundamental importance. Thus for example there is in us the principle, do the good and avoid the evil, keep order, respect you neighbour's property, etc.

These moral obligations have the following characteristics:

CHAPTER VIII

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They are universally valid and respected by the human reason. All of them are based upon the speculative reason, which is common to all normal people. Whosever does not confront to them is commonly regarded as being foolish and abnormal. All of these principles are regarded as being just and our normal understanding tells us that it is unjust to violate these inner principles. They play a great importance in our human life and nearly dominate it. Of course, every man has the physical power to neglect these principles, - but every transgression against them is conceived of by the I as being wrong. Having done wrong the self feels compunctions and remorse. He is a necious of the fact that he has done wrong.

The question arises whence are these inner moral principles? What are the underlying grounds for them? The answer will be that they are not merely subjective; for if they were we could get rid of them without the least feeling of guilt and discomfort. But that is not the case. The inner voice of the conscience is not silent, but informs us about what is right and what is wrong.

One cannot explain away these facts by a reference to early education and training etc, be it given by parents or by professors. For we would not accept those principles from them if they did not appear as true to our own rational nature. A child does not blindly believe, - but on the contrary makes its own inquiries and adopts only what appears to

they are universally valid and respected by the human reason, which do those or season, which the or common to the or common at a common to all normal people, ancessed one and one is common to them is commonly remarded as being it into and and annothed. It is then and an all one is a time of times principles are required to all an unjust to violate and one times in a time to the times principles. They play a great inportance in our times and control to occare, averaged as in our times the occare, averaged and control power to regions these principles, - the every to represent the control of the interpression applies their them is an occared and the interpression and the sent the sent to consequent the control of the interpression of the time the interpression and the interpression are the sent the interpression and the interpression and principles and the interpression and the interpression and principles are these whence the orange are these interpression and principles.

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true and real. If education were something merely trained it would be very easily lost and man would not feel it severely. But our reason does not allow such a moral freedom toward those inner moral principles, - - they simply have to be obeyed.

The sufficient reason for these inner moral principles can also not be found in the customs and traditions of our environment, which we would consciously or unconsciously have adopted. For if those inner moral principles were nothing else but merely socially determined mental attitudes then it would be very easy to get rid of them without any feeling of remorse and compunction. But that is simply impossible. It is of course true that society influences us, but even this were impossible unless I were willing to be influenced by it understanding the whole situation. Only if I understand something as right I am willing to be influenced by it and to adopt it.

There are of course differences among nations about some details of these moral principles, but generally one is entitled to say that all mormal men are conscious of the same fundamental really moral principles. All men feel the necessity to follow the inward monitor of one's soul in order to have a pure and free conscience and not a sense of guilt. It is only in the practical use of these principles that men differ and make mistakes. Here manifests itself the uncertainty of reason, the power of passion, the weakness of the will,

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the influence of education, of customs and traditions, heredity and so on. But inspite of these influences and even contraty to them the moral sense of our reason points out what man ought to do and what not.

The moral law within us is a fact separated from any human arbitrariness. It must have been implanted in man by a being superior to himself. This must be a superhuman or transcendental being. It can only have originated from what is understood to be God. The moral law implies a lawgiver who implanted it in men and made it universally valid and necessary. It is experienced by men as an innate human principle.

God must be a finite being according to the priniciple that the effect corresponds to the cause. The moral world is not infinite and without mistakes, but it is a world striving toward ever higher and better standards of living and stands thus in harmony with the great evolutionary process.

The eudaemological argument for God.

Under eudeamonism I understand Glückseligkeitslehre.

This argument has the task to give a better form for Kant's stress on the idea of happiness, from which he postulated the immortality of the human soul, the existence of God, and even the Divine attributes.

The desire for happiness is deeply anchored in the human soul. That this is true is the experience of everybody day after day. This longing for happiness may be characterized

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as follows:

It is a natural impulse with us to attain a timetranscending, never ending, and unlimited happiness. Every
man wants to be happy not only for one day but for ever and
he fights against the causes of unhappiness. Man demands
an eternal unlimited happiness that fulfils all the wishes
and that does not leave one request ungranted.

This desire for happiness is naturally present in all normal human beings. It is innate in every man, and as such a part of the normal equipment of every men. Even the man who commits suicide stands under this ban of the desire for happiness. He takes his life but for the one reason that he did not find the happiness in life he desired. He finishes his life in order to escape from all the sorrows and disappointments that he had to experience in place of the wanted happiness.

The natural desire for happiness is a fundamental desire for every normal being. This becomes evident if one considers that it is not only the desire for bodily well-being, but that it consists mostly in the desire for mental and spiritual well-being or happiness. Happiness is the fulfilment of all the human dreams and hopes for the future.

Out of all this it becomes evident that in a harmonious universe this desire must be satisfied, - - otherwise there would be no sense in having it. The whole nature shows us that there is no desire as fundamental as happiness that is

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Out of all this desire must be activited, - - otherwise there of the and the state of the state

left unsatisfied. Nature has given to all of our desires satisfaction and this within the limits of possible reach. Thus for instance when a plant thirsts for rain or sunshine nature makes it possible that each one of these desires can be fullfilled. It is obvious that the human being cannot be excluded from this fundamental principle of nature. This especially not since man is the crown of the whole creation, in whom order, purposiveness and design ought to find their highest expression. If with him the most outstanding desires would remain unsatisfied then the crown of the whole creation would be in discord with the rest of nature. But that would be contrary to the principle of unity and harmony prevailing in hature. Consequently the human desire for happiness and perfection must be satisfied as any other human desire. Man must finally be in possession of an eternal and unlimited happiness.

This can become only possible if God exists; for He alone can provide for an unlimited happiness and guarantee its eternal duration. Besides that the highest happiness toward which men are striving is after all nothing else but the oneness or the close communion with God; for men strive toward an existing happiness and not to a shadow of reality without any inner life. Men want to possess unmeasurable existing happiness. It does not need to be infinite for that might be too much for the human soul and body. But

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it should be a happiness great enough to transcend all the limits of earthly things. Such a happiness can only be found in and through God, for God is the unmeasurable highest good. Thus from the desire of happiness as it is contained in the human soul the existence of God as the highest good can be inferred with certainty.

It should to thep these great enough to transpend all the limits of earthly things. Such a happiness can only be found in and through God, for God is the unmissurable highest good. Thus from the desire of happiness as it is contained in the human soul the existence of God or the highest good orn

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY

The two last considered new arguments for God show us God in a beautifullight. The deontological argument shows us God as the just and powerful personality. He is the author of the moral law and is manifested in the conscience of every men. The eudaemological argument shows us God as the highest possible good toward which man is striving, and never finds rest unless he rests in Him.

From both we can learn that the desire for morality and happiness are no contrasts but that both are very closely connected. Whosoever by faithful performance of his duty becomes a morally good man and thus satisfies his desire for morality, attains at the same time in connection with it the satisfaction for his desire for happiness, for one and the same God is the guaranter for both.

Morality has of course more importance than being a bringer of happiness. It is universally necessary and valid for every personality. If a person does not follow it he will also lose the satisfaction of his desire for happiness. One and the same God is the guarantee for both of it; for as the giver of them moral law and the highest good he connects morality with happiness and immorality with misery.

Kant treatment of the moral argument obtained thus

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The two isst constanted new arguments for ded and a stood of the second interest of the decided of the second and powerful personality. He is the author of the morel law and is manifested in the sonscience of every use. The suddenological expundent shows us dod as the interest possible good toward which man is striving, and never finds rest unless he rests in Ein.

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a correction. The valuable elements of Kant's treatment of this argument were retained and elaborated; but the rest left out.

Kant defies the possibility of any rational proof of the existence of God based upon the speculative reason. We form the idea of an empirical whole, of a whole of experience, and we conceive this system of objects, this universe of things, or phenomena, as something existing apart from us. Men forget that it is their own idea, and thus make an entity of it. Men presentites an individual thing, as the highest reality, all-sufficient, eternal, and simple. This is done by all theology in its proof for the existence of God. The ideal of transcendental theology is God. He is the ideal of all existence, but the ideal of the most real being is a mere idea. Man cannot get any knowledge whatsoever from the transcendental reality. Men are sense-bound and have to be satisfied with the sense-data.

There are three proofs for the existence of God, the teleological, the cosmological, and the ontological, all of them are worthless according to Kant.

To take the ontological argument: The conception of a being that contains all reality does not imply existence. Existence does not follow from the notion of the most real being. Here man spins out of an entirely arbitrary idea the existence of an object correspondent to it.

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of all possible experience (world or cosmos) the existence of a necessary being. God alone can be conceived as such a being. We have no roght, however, to conclude that because we think there must be an absolutely perfect and necessary being, such a being exists. This is really the ontological proof over again. Moreover, the argument concludes from the accidental or contingent to a cause. Such an inference has no meaning outside of the phenomenal world, but in the cosmological proof it is used to transcend experience, which an an epistemological impossibility. Kant pointed out that this argument contained a nest of dialectical assumptions. It may be permissible to assume the existence of God as the cause of all possible effects, in order to assist reason in the search for the unity of causes, but to say that such a being exists necessarily, is an impudent assurance of apodictic certainty for which there is no basis at all. The unconditional necessity, which the human reason requires as the last support of things, is according to Kant the true abyss of the human reason.

The teleological argument infers the existence of a Supreme Being from the nature and arrangement of the present world. But, it too, fails according to Kant. The manifoldness, order and beauty of the world, it tells us, lead us to infer a cause of its origin and continuance. Such a cause must possess a higher degree of perfection than any possible experience of ours. What is to prevent us from conceiving all

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possible perfection as united in this Supreme Cause as in one single substance? The proof derserves respect; - - it is the oldest and clearest and most in conformity with the human reason. It reveals purposes and ends in nature, where our observation would not itself have detected them. Nevertheless, one cannot approve to its claims to apodictic certainty. It is an argument by analogy, inferring from the similarity between natural products and works of the human art that a similar causality, namely understanding, will, and intelligence lies at the bootom of nature. But an analogy does not give us any new information but those already contained in the concept we have of it. At best this argument could establish the belief in an architect of the world, but not in an infinite God. The teleological argument leads from experience to the cosmological proof, which is merely the disguised ontological proof. Thus the ontological proof would be the only possible proof if such a proof were possible at all. But that is impossible for all synthetic principles of the understanding are applicable immanently only, and that is in the realm of the phenomenal reality. But in order to arrive at a knowledge of God me must use them transcendentally, which is simply impossible.

But the existence of God is necessary for the practical life. Our volitional nature implies it, and from this practical cal necessity, one can postulate the existence of God. As a

at it - - placeres avviocies took eds formation of it is Two oregin to some of spice bus secondar allower of . donese onservetten sould not like if here detected them. mereticaless, one common approve to the claims to epocicite destrainty. It ts on ar unent by enelogy, interring from the similarity similar ossasiley, mamoly understanding, will, and intelli-Jon acob groupes as the sorten to motoon off ta atil soney Biros Jumingia sida Jaca th. . Il to avad ow Justice all den des infloor and to desiders an at lelies end delication mints about termine incl closed boy . bor extent in hi blow Trong Lasingloino ont sail . Trong Lasingloides bealing it to selutoring offerings ile tol eloissoget at fand dur . Ile the understanding are applicable immenently only, and that is is the reals of the phenomenal reality. But in order to er-. (Liste of a succeed e of God me must use them brenscance of sever . aldi roged tipple et doin

 of God. He is the giver of the summum bonum, and distributes happiness to those who followed the moral law. It is the aim of every person to obtain happiness and to be moral; but both need the existence of God to become complete. Life must be an infinite progress toward the highest good, which God is Himself.

Kant's treatment of the arguments for God is not without defects as has been shown in this thesis; but it has become the foundation for the modern approach to the arguments for God. The theoretical possibility for any speculative knowledge of God is denied, -- His existence cannot be demonstrated scientifically. But the moral law presupposes His existence.

At the close of his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Kant expresses his own innermost being in stating:

Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht; je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir.

It is the respect for the moral order within his own being that caused him to respect the author of the order and sustainer of the external world.

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It is the respect for the moral order within his own being that caused him to respect the nuchor of the external world.

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